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I.

INTRODUCTION

Year in Review contains a brief summary of every decision published by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1990. Due to the volume of
cases, space does not permit a thorough discussion and critique of
each decision. We have attempted however, to highlight decisions representing a departure from prior law or resolving issues of first impression. Other cases are necessarily discussed in a more cursory manner.
For easy reference, the opinions have been grouped into twelve
categories according to the general subject matter of their holdings
rather than the nature of the underlying claims: administrative law,
business law, constitutional law, criminal law, employment law, family
law, fish and game law, procedure, property, tax law and torts. In
some instances, these categories have been further divided into subcategories representing more specific legal areas.
The primary purpose of Year in Review is to inform the practitioner of cases decided in 1990, the substantive areas of law addressed,
the statutes or prior common law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the holdings. Additionally, where necessary, Year in
Review provides some additional background information.
II.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

The Alaska Supreme Court heard seven cases in the area of administrative law in 1990 and resolved each case on a strict literal reading of the statutes involved. The cases arose in the varied contexts of:
municipal government, payment of permanent fund dividends, environmental law, utility rates, Medicaid payments and administrative
decisions by the Department of Corrections. Each case will be discussed in turn.
McCormick v. Smith 1 involved a petition for a recall vote of several school board members. The Alaska Supreme Court adopted the
Copyright © 1991 by Alaska Law Review
1. 793 P.2d 1042 (Alaska 1990) ("McCormick I").
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appellants' literal interpretation of both Alaska Statutes sections
29.26.260(a)(3), which requires that an application for a petition state
grounds for recall with particularity, 2 and 29.26.300, which provides
for a six-month waiting period if a petition for recall is rejected as
insufficient before a new application may be filed. 3 The court held that
the application, not the petition itself, was insufficient in this situation,
and that the six-month waiting period is "not triggered when a petition for recall is rejected because a municipal clerk erroneously accepted" an earlier application that did not sufficiently set the grounds
for recall as required by section 20.26.260(a)(3). 4 The court noted that
the purpose of the waiting period, to avoid harassment of an official by
repeated attempts to throw him out of office, was not undermined by a
situation such as this where the deficiency was an error by the munici5
pal clerk.
The school official who sought to have the election enjoined in
McCormick I filed a motion for reconsideration of the award of attorney's fees and costs to the defendants, claiming that she was a public
interest litigant. 6 Applying the four-pronged test used in Southeast
Alaska Conservation Council,Inc. v. State,7 the Alaska Supreme Court
agreed with Smith's argument that the case concerned strong public
policy and that many people would benefit from the outcome." The
court also considered it important that only a private party could be
expected to file a petition for recall, and that the official involved
served without pay and thus prevention of her recall provided no economic incentive to fie. Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees and
costs to the defendants was vacated. 9
2. The statute provides: "(a) An application for a recall petition shall be filed
with the municipal clerk and shall contain... (3) a statement in 200 words or less of
the grounds for recall stated with particularity." ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.260(a)(3)
(Supp. 1990).
3. The statute provides: "A new application for a petition to recall the same
official may not be filed sooner than six months after a petition is rejected as insufficient." ALASKA STAT. § 29.26.300 (1986).
4. McCormick I, 793 P.2d at 1046-47.

5. Id. at 1047.
6. McCormick v. Smith, 799 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1990) ("McCormick 11").
7. 665 P.2d 544, 553 (Alaska 1983). The four prongs of the test are whether "(1)
the case was designed to effectuate strong public policies, (2) numerous people would
have benefitted had [the plaintiff] prevailed, (3) only a private party could have been
expected to bring the suit, and (4) [the plaintiff] did not otherwise have a sufficient
economic incentive to file suit." McCormick II, 799 P.2d at 287.
8. Id. at 288. The court wrestled with the fact that in challenging the petition
Smith actually sought to imapede voting. Ultimately, however, the court held that the
issue litigated should be determinative - not the particular stance of the party claiming to be a "public interest" litigant - so long as the suit is not frivolous. Id.
9. Id.
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State Department of Revenue v. Gazaway10 concerned the denial
of permanent fund dividends11 to children who divided their year between their mother's home in Oklahoma and their father's home in
Alaska. The Department of Revenue had concluded that the children's absences from the state were not allowable under either section
23.4600) or section 23.6650) of title 15 of the Alaska Administrative
Code.12 The Department of Revenue reasoned that only absences that
are shorter than the time actually spent in Alaska are allowable under
these provisions. 13 The Alaska Supreme Court found that the children's absences were not temporary in nature or duration, and therefore the children were not entitled to permanent fund dividends during
14
the relevant period.
15
In Trusteesfor Alaska v. State Departmentof NaturalResources,
five environmental groups (the "Trustees") sought to overturn the
competitive sale of oil and gas leases by the Alaska Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR"). The Alaska Supreme Court held that
the Trustees had been given sufficient opportunity to comment on the
DNR's finding that the proposed sale was in the state's best interests. 16
10. 793 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1990).
11. "The 'permanent fund' is an account established by the Alaska Constitution
into which is placed a portion of the money paid to the state by developers of Alaska's
natural resources. Each year a portion of the earnings of the fund is distributed as
'dividends' to qualified Alaska residents who apply to receive them." Id. at 1026 n.1
(citing ALASKA STAT. § 37.13.020 (1988)).
12. Id. at 1027. Title 15 of the Alaska Administrative Code provides twelve circumstances in which absence from the state during the six month period prior to
applying for the dividend will be excused. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, §§ 23.460,
23.665 (Oct. 1988). Of the enumerated reasons, the court held that only two would
potentially apply to the Gazaway children. Gazaway, 793 P.2d at 1027. Those sections are:
An absence for any other purpose will, in the department's discretion, be
allowed by the department if the nature and duration of the absence are
temporary and are consistent with an intent to return to the state and remain
permanently in the state.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.4600) (repealed 1989) (relating to 1982 permanent fund dividends).
An absence ...will, in the department's discretion, be allowed by the department if the nature and duration of the absence are temporary and are
consistent with an intent to return to the state and remain permanently in
the state.
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, § 23.6650) (repealed 1989) (relating to 1983 and subsequent permanent fund dividends).
13. Gazaway, 793 P.2d at 1027.
14. Id. at 1027-28.
15. 795 P.2d 805 (Alaska 1990).
16. Id. at 809. The DNR's "best interest" finding was made available to the public for comment twenty-one days prior to the DNR's final decision, in accordance with
ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.035(e) (Supp. 1990), and public notice of the sale was made
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The court, however, remanded the case to the DNR for a more thorough consideration of the environmental risks presented by the transportation of oil from platforms in Camden Bay, which is adjacent to
the Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge, in the event that Congress does
not open the Refuge to allow offshore support facilities to be constructed. 17 The agency was not required, however, to demonstrate the
economic feasibility of development, provided that the state benefits
from the lease.1"
The court did reverse one part of the DNR's decision. The DNR
had performed its own "consistency review" to insure that the leases
were consistent with the Alaska Coastal Management Program
("ACMP"), which operates to protect the environment of Alaska's
coastal zone.19 The court held that Alaska Statutes section
44.19.145(a)(11) requires the Office of Management and Budget
("OMB") to perform the consistency review, and that OMB could not
delegate that duty to the DNR. 20 Under the plain language of the
statute, 21 the court found that OMB must render the consistency determination since the project in question required two or more state
22
leases.
In Alaska ConsumerAdvocacy Program v. Alaska Public Utilities
Commission,2 3 the Alaska Supreme Court held that the Alaska Public
Utilities Commission ("APUC") did not have the authority to consider Alascom's interstate revenue in setting intrastate telephone
rates. 24 Alascom filed a request with APUC for an intrastate rate in25
crease because it had an intrastate revenue deficiency of $29 million.
During the APUC proceedings, the Alaska Consumer Advocacy Program ("ACAP") argued that Alascom's excess revenues derived from
an interstate agreement with AT&T should be used to offset the intra26
state deficiency, and thus intrastate rates should actually be reduced.
thirty days prior to sale, in accordance with ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.945(b) (Supp.
1990). Trustees for Alaska, 795 P.2d at 808-09.
17. Id. at 810-11.
18. Id.
19. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.40.010-210 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
20. Trusteesfor Alaska, 795 P.2d at 811-12.
21. The statute provides, in pertinent part, that the OMB shall
(11) render, on behalf of the state, all federal consistency determinations
and certifications authorized by 16 U.S.C. [§11456 (§ 307, Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972), and each conclusive state consistency determination when a project requires a permit, lease, or authorization from two or
more state resource agencies.
ALASKA STAT. § 44.19.145(a)(1 1) (Supp. 1990).
22. Trusteesfor Alaska, 795 P.2d at 812.
23. 793 P.2d 1028 (Alaska 1990).
24. Id. at 1032.
25. Id. at 1030.
26. Id.
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However, because the revenues derived from the agreement between
AT&T and Alascom were interstate revenues, the supreme court held
that APUC had no jurisdiction over these agreements. 27 Thus, APUC
could not consider any excess interstate revenues during intrastate
28
ratemaking proceedings.
City of Cordova v. Medicaid Rate Commission 29 involved overpayment made to two hospitals for care rendered under Medicaid.
The superior court permitted the state to recoup the overpayment as
an offset against the next year's payments. 30 The supreme court reversed, refusing to permit the Commission to recover retroactively alleged overpayment to hospitals. 31 The court held that Alaska Statutes
section 47.07.070, which sets out the prospective payment scheme, did
not authorize the Commission to consider audit reports of past transactions in determining the prospective payment rates for the current
32
fiscal year.
The court also held that because Alaska Statutes sections
47.07.120-130 requires that the members of the Commission be appointed by the governor, 33 the participation of a designee of the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Human Services in the
34
Commission hearings was unlawful.
The Alaska Supreme Court in Hertz v. Carothers35 affirmed the
dismissal of an inmate plaintiff's request for review of the Department
of Correction's policy to purchase prisoner commissary items from a
certain local store. 36 The superior court had dismissed the case on the
grounds that under the Administrative Procedure Act, it has no jurisdiction over administrative decisions made by the Department of
Corrections. 37
27. Id. at 1032.
28. Id.
29. 789 P.2d 346 (Alaska 1990).
30. Id. at 349.
31. Id. at 350.
32. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 47.07.070 (1990).
33. Id. at 352; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 47.07.120-130 (1990).
34. Id. at 352-53.
35. 784 P.2d 659 (Alaska 1990) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 660.
37. Id; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 22. 10.010(d) (1988), 44.62.330 (1989). The supreme
court noted, however, that state courts could review decisions of the Department of
Corrections "in major disciplinary proceedings where issues of constitutional magnitude are raised." Hertz 784 P.2d at 660.
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BUSINESs LAW

In 1990, the court decided sixteen cases in the area of business
law. The cases have been classified under three subheadings: insurance, securities and contracts.
A.

Insurance

Litigation involving insurance companies involved a broad variety of issues in 1990. The Alaska Supreme Court dealt with the liability of secondary insurers, the liability of municipalities for water main
breaks, contractor and surety insurers, and automobile insurance.
The extent of the liability of a secondary insurer was the principal
38
issue in Alaska Rural Electric CooperativeAssociation v. INSCO, Ltd.
Matanuska :Electric Association was a member of the Alaska Rural
Electric Cooperative Association ("ARECA"). ARECA had
purchased policies for its various members from Ambassador Insurance Company as its primary insurer, and INSCO as a secondary
39
insurer.
In 1980, Matanuska made two claims arising from a single occurrence that exceeded its self-insured amount by $205,000. 40 While Ambassador, as primary insurer, ordinarily would have paid the full
amount of the claim, it did not do so because without paying Matanuska's claim, it went into receivership in 1983 and was liquidated in
1987. ARECA, the policy owner, requested that INSCO, as its secondary insurer, "drop down" and cover the deficiency, a request which
INSCO refused. 4 1 ARECA sought a declaratory judgment requiring
INSCO to cover the deficiency, but the superior court granted INSCO's summary judgment motion, holding that INSCO did not have
42
an obligation to assume the insolvent primary carrier's obligations.
The Alaska Supreme Court held that the issue was one of first
impression in Alaska, although it did refer to two cases dealing with
similar issues. 4 3 In affirming the decision of the superior court, the
supreme court reiterated the principle that an insurance contract, because it is a contract of adhesion, is to be construed according to the
38. 785 P.2d 1193 (Alaska 1990).
39. Id. at 1194.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1193 & n.1. The court referred to Hamrick v. Shishaldin Fisheries,
Inc., 708 P.2d 705 (Alaska 1985) (secondary insurer not required to cover primary
insurer's portion of a settlement following primary insurer's insolvency) and Providence Wash. Ins. Co. v. Alaska Pac. Assurance Co., 603 P.2d 899 (Alaska 1979) (secondary insurance is not triggered when primary insurance fully covered settlement
amount).
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reasonable expectations of the parties involved. 44 According to the
court, since neither ARECA nor INSCO had expected the insolvency
of Ambassador, and therefore had not factored consequently, the risk
of such insolvency into the cost of the coverage, absent policy language to the contrary, INSCO was not required to "drop down" upon
the insolvency of Ambassador. 4 5 The court found the language of the
policy unambiguous in its intent to cover Matanuska only
after it in46
curred a loss in excess of the primary insurer's coverage.
ARECA argued that the provision in the INSCO policy for
"other insurance" 47 included the Ambassador policy as "other insurance" that was not "valid and collectible" under the policy, requiring
INSCO to cover Ambassador's deficiency. 4 8 The Alaska Supreme
Court specifically rejected this claim, finding that "the term 'collectible' in another insurance clause does not create an ambiguity as to the
excess insurer's coverage in the case of the primary insurer's
insolvency." 49
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Municipality of Anchorage50
arose out of the breaking of a water main which damaged the homes of
two of the plaintiff's insured homeowners.5 1 The homeowners sued
the municipality of Anchorage under negligence and strict liability
theories. The homeowners' insurance company, State Farm, was substituted as the real party in interest after paying the homeowners' theories. 52 Testimony showed that the break was most likely caused by
frost-jacking.5 3 Although there are several methods to prevent frostjacking, 54 there was no evidence that the defendant took any measures
to protect against such an event.55 The trial judge refused to apply
44. INSCO, 785 P.2d at 1194 (citing State v. Underwriters at Lloyds, 755 P.2d
396, 400 (Alaska 1988)). The court also noted that "[ilt is not unfair to leave the risk
of insolvency with the insured since the insured selected the primary carrier." Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1195.
47. The clause provided that:
If other valid and collectible insurance, which is written by another insurer
is available to the Insured covering a loss also covered by this policy, other
than insurance that is in excess of this policy, the insurance afforded by this
policy shall be in excess of and shall not contribute with such other
insurance.

Id. at 1196.
48. 'Id.
49. Id.
50. 788 P.2d 726 (Alaska 1990).
51. Id. at 727.
52. Id. at 728.

53. Frost-jacking occurs when moist soil freezes around the pipes, pushing them
upwards as the soil below freezes. Id. at 727 n.1.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 728.
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strict liability against the municipality and refused, over State Farm's
objection, to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The jury found no
56
negligence on the part of the municipality.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's refusal to
apply strict liability, finding that water distribution is not an ultrahazardous activity 57 because water delivery, unlike explosives,
could be made safe by the application of reasonable care.58 In doing
so, the court observed that it joined the majority of American
59
jurisdictions.
State Farm argued that the court should impose strict liability
because a utility is best able to insure against water main breaks and is
able to distribute the costs among all the system's users. 6° Although
the court had applied strict liability for such reasons in products liability litigation, 6 1 it refused to do so for water main breaks, reasoning
that homeowners can insure against such losses and, in Alaska, the
many small, private water utilities would be unduly burdened by the
imposition of strict liability.62 The court noted, however, that State
Farm had not argued that strict liability should apply to the municipality under either the common law doctrine of lateral or subadjacent
support, or the takings clause of the Alaska Constitution. 63
The supreme court did reverse the trial judge's refusal to instruct
the jury on res ipsa loquitur.64 Following its earlier holding in
Widmyer v. Southeast Skyways Inc., 65 the supreme court held that
State Farm had introduced sufficient evidence to support all three elements 66 of the res ipsa test. 67 The court thus remanded the case as it
was appropriate that the municipality, as owner and installer of the
56. Id.
57. Id. at 728-29. The court specifically refused to apply Fletcher v. Rylands, 1
L.R.-Ex. 265 (Ex. 1866), aff'd 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (1868) (imposing strict liability
for the release of impounded water), noting that Fletcher concerned "non-natural"
uses of land, such as dams, whereas "water lines are neither as risky nor as unusual as
earthen dams." Id. at 728.
58. Id. at 729.
59. Id. (citing as examples: Interstate Sash & Door Co. v. City of Cleveland, 148
Ohio St. 325, 74 N.E.2d 239 (1947) and Midwest Oil Co. v. City of Aberdeen, 69 S.D.
343, 10 N.W.2d 701 (1943)).
60. Id.
61. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 881 & n.25, 882 n.34
(Alaska 1979); Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244, 247 (Alaska
1969).
62. State Farm, 788 P.2d at 729.
63. Id. at 729 n.6.

64. Id at 731.
65. 584 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1978).
66. The elements of the res ipsa loquitur test are: "(1) the accident is one which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the agency or
instrumentality is within the exclusive control of the defendant; [and] (3) the injurious
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broken pipe, bear the burden of establishing whether or not the pipe
68
was installed negligently.
In Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins,69 the defendants
Alaska Pacific Assurance Company and Insurance Company of North
America (collectively "ALPAC") appealed a jury award providing
compensatory and punitive damages against it for: (1) negligently depriving the plaintiff Collins of the benefit of an insurance agreement;
(2) violating the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
denying the benefits; and (3) breaching its contractual duty to provide
the plaintiff insurance and defend him in court. 70 The claim arose out
of Collins' construction and sale of a house. The homeowners demanded their money back when the house was severely damaged as it
settled into the permafrost. 7 1 Collins refused, and the dispute resulted
in a non-jury trial at which compensatory and punitive damages were
72
awarded against him.
Collins had notified ALPAC of the buyers' claim against him well
before the suit was actually filed, seeking coverage and defense under
the terms of his insurance policy. ALPAC denied his claim under the
"completed work" exception to the Comprehensive General Liability
portion of the policy. 73 Following the judgment against him, Collins
brought suit against ALPAC. ALPAC later appealed summary judgment rulings and a jury verdict in Collins' favor. 74
The Alaska Supreme Court first held that ALPAC was estopped
from relying on a "products" exclusion in its appeal since it had relied
75
on a "completed work" exclusion throughout the earlier litigation.
The court then dealt with whether the superior court had erred when
condition or occurrence was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the plaintiff." State Farm, 788 P.2d at 730 (quoting Widmyer, 584 P.2d at 11).

67. Id. at 731.
68. Id. at 730-31. In dissent, Justice Compton argued that Alaska's climate is
"less kind than most to water mains" and that "where there is evidence that in the
locality a particular type of accident frequently occurs as the result of unpredictable
natural forces, res ipsa loquitur should not apply." Id. at 731 (Compton, J., dissenting) (quoting City of Houston v. Church, 554 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Ct. App. 1977),
and citing Widmyer, 584 P.2d at 13-14).
69. 794 P.2d 936 (Alaska 1990).
70. Id. at 937.

71. Id. at 938.
72. Id. at 939.

73. Id. at 938. The exclusion denied "coverage with respect to 'completed operations' for property damage to work performed by [Collins] arising out of such work or
any portion thereof, or out of such materials, parts or equipment furnished in connec-

tion therewith." Id.
74. Id. at 939-40.
75. Id. at 942. ALPAC had originally denied the claim under both the "products" and the "completed work" exclusions, but prior to any legal action ALPAC had

determined that the "products" exclusion did not apply to Collins' claim. Id. at 938.
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it concluded that the "completed work" exception did not apply to the
homeowners' claim against Collins. The court reiterated its policy of
honoring the reasonable expectations of parties to an insurance contract 76 and construing any ambiguities against the insurer. 77 In construing the "completed work" exception, the court held that "where a
house is built by an insured contractor, coverage will exist to the extent that damage is caused by external forces, and not by forces arising
out of the insured's own work." 78 The court found that there was a
material issue as to whether the damage to the house arose out of Collins' work or from external forces and thus the issue was one for the
jury.7 9 The superior court had therefore erred in granting summary
judgment on the matter.
The court also found that a material issue existed as to whether
the damages were done by someone other than Collins, specifically, a
subcontractor. According to the court, if this were the case, the "com80
pleted work" exception would not exclude protection.
The supreme court next addressed the issue of the superior
court's grant of summary judgment on the matter of ALPAC's breach
of duty to defend Collins. The court ruled that a reasonable investigation of Collins' claim would have indicated to ALPAC that the "completed work" exception did not apply. 81 Since the record revealed no
indication of the extent of ALPAC's investigation, the court ruled that
the facts were inadequate to support the superior court's grant of sum82
mary judgment.
The court then turned to the issue of Collins' entitlement to collect from ALPAC in tort for ALPAC's negligence in performing contractual duties (investigating the claim) and for breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court ruled that the jury
instructions concerning ALPAC's tort liability were erroneous in that
they were given following an erroneous grant of summary judgment
against ALPAC for breach of contract.8 3 The court further determined that tort damages for "negligence" in performing contractual
duties were inappropriate ALPAC's duties arose from the insurance
84
contract, so the action sounded in contract, not in tort.
76. Id. (citing O'Neill Investigations, Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins., 636 P.2d
1170, 1177 (Alaska 1981)); see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
77. Alaska Pac.Ins. Co., 794 P.2d at 942 (citing Starry v. Horace Mann Ins. Co.,
649 P.2d 937, 939 (Alaska 1982)).
78. Id. at 942-43.
79. Id. at 944.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 945.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 945-46.
84. Id. at 946-47.
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Although it was proper for the superior court to allow Collins to
recover tort damages based upon the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, the court reversed the award in this case since the
jury should have first been presented with the issues handled on sum85
mary judgment.
The court upheld the trial court's summary judgment ruling
against Collins on his claim of fraudulent misrepresentation in the sale
of the insurance policy.8 6 Such a claim is viable only if the plaintiff
can establish "'an affirmative misrepresentation or an omission where
there is a duty to disclose.' "87 The failure of the ALPAC agent to
disclose that this specific type of claim was not covered did not
amount to a misrepresentation or omission because, while the agent's
statements did "not clearly inform Collins of the coverage exclusions,
it also [did] not constitute a representation that Collins' work
would
'88
be covered in a situation similar to the one involved here."
Finally, "to provide guidance for the retrial," the court discussed
damages that Collins might be entitled to on remand.8 9 Since the
judgment against him in the prior litigation was satisfied by a bond,
the court found that Collins could not be entitled to damages based on
any money paid in the previous litigation since it was not a loss that he
had incurred. 90 The court further ruled that Collins was not entitled
to attorney's fees other than those authorized under Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 82.91 The court left open the possibility that Collins
might recover for: "(1) mental and emotional anxiety; (2) impairment
of credit rating; (3) impairment of reputation; (4) impairment92of ability
to obtain insurance and bonding; and (5) loss of earnings."
In Burton v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 9 3 the plaintiff, Burton, purchased a policy from State Farm, which provided both liability
coverage, and uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage.
The policy covered both Burton and permissive drivers of his vehicle,
but excluded liability coverage for bodily injury to any insured person.94 Four months after obtaining coverage, Burton was injured
while he was a passenger in his own vehicle. He sought damages from
85. Id. at 947.
86. Id. at 948.
87. Id. at 947 (quoting Matthews v. Kincaid, 746 P.2d 470, 471 (Alaska 1987)).
88. Id. at 948.

89. Id.

90. Id.

91. Id. at 949. The trial court had, in addition to awarding Collins attorney's fees
under Civil Rule 82, allowed the jury to award attorney's fees as damages. Id. at 948-

49.
92. Id. at 949.
93. 796 P.2d 1361 (Alaska 1990).

94. Id. at 1362.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

State Farm, reasoning that he fit within the underinsured provision as
the policy's liability limit of $100,000 was less than his actual damages. 9 5 Burton argued that the limiting language in the liability and
underinsured motor vehicle coverage of his policy was contrary to
public policy, in that it provided him with less underinsured motor
vehicle coverage than is required by statute.96
The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, finding that Burton's vehicle
was an underinsured vehicle for purposes of Alaska Statutes section
28.40.100(a)(16) and that the policy violated the requirement of section 21.89.020(C). 97 The court noted that section 28.22.231(1) provides that uninsured and underinsured coverage does not protect an
insured while occupying an uninsured vehicle owned by the insured or
by a relative. 98 The court then found it implicit that if an insured is
occupying an insured vehicle owned by him, he is protected. 99 Finding that State Farm had failed to provide coverage where the insured
vehicle was an underinsured vehicle, the court ruled that the statute
provided no such exclusion. 0 0 Having invalidated the exclusion in
Burton's policy, the court found State Farm's liability limited to the
statutory minimum.10
In Loyal Orderof Moose, Lodge 1392 v. InternationalFidelityInsurance Co.,102 the plaintiff Moose Lodge contracted with Darling Enterprises for the construction of a new facility in Fairbanks. 0 3
Pursuant to this contract, Darling obtained performance and payment
bonds from International Fidelity Insurance Company ("IFI"), naming Moose Lodge as "obligee." 10 4
Following an unresolved contractual dispute, Moose Lodge declared Darling in default and requested IFI either to complete the contract or guarantee payment of damages incurred by the Lodge in
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1362-63.

97. Id. at 1363. The statute requires that insurance companies offering automobile insurance offier uninsured and underinsured motor vehicle coverage with limits at
least equal to those of the liability coverage. ALASKA STAT. § 21.89.020(c) (1984 &
Supp. 1990).
98. Burton, 796 P.2d at 1363.
99. Id.

100. Id. The court held that although Alaska Statutes section 28.22.301 permits
insurers to include exclusionary clauses in their policies, the legislature did not intend
to permit insurers to rewrite the definition of "underinsured motor vehicle." Id.
101. Id. at 1364.
102. 797 P.2d 622 (Alaska 1990).
103. Id. at 623.
104. Id. The performance bond provided that if Darling defaulted, IFI would
either complete the contract or hire another contractor to do so. The payment bond
provided that any unpaid subcontractor could sue on the bond for payment. Id. at
624.
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completing construction. Instead of complying with this request, IFI
encouraged settlement or arbitration of the dispute between Moose
Lodge and Darling.1 05 Moose Lodge rejected these suggestions and
brought a tort claim of bad faith inaction against IFI. 10 6 The superior
court granted summary judgment for IFI, holding that a legitimate
dispute existed between Darling and Moose Lodge and that until that
dispute was settled, IFI was not required to complete the project or
respond in damages.10 7
The supreme court reversed, reasoning that "failure by a surety
minimally to investigate its principal's alleged default may constitute
bad faith if that investigation would confirm the obligee's allegations
in material part." 10 8 In concluding that an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing existed between the surety and its obligee,10 9 the
court found the relationship between a surety and its obligee more
analogous to that of an insurer and its insured than to that of an insurer and its incidental third-party beneficiary. 110 Consequently, the
court found that a surety may "satisfy its duty of good faith to its
obligee by acting reasonably in response to a claim by its obligee, and
by acting promptly to remedy or perform the principal's duties where
default is clear." 11 Because there was insufficient evidence as to
whether IFI fulfilled this duty, the supreme court held that the superior court's grant of summary judgment was in error. 112 The supreme
court upheld, however, the superior court's ruling that IFI may require Moose Lodge to submit to arbitration.1 13 The court declined to
consider whether the surety's participation in arbitration proceedings
114
was mandatory.
State Department of Transportation v. Houston Casualty Company11 5 arose out of a wrongful death action involving the insurance
105. Id. at 625.
106. Id. at 625-26.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 628.
109. Id. at 626. The court relied partially on State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v.
Nicholson, 777 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Alaska 1989) ("[tjhe tort of bad faith in the insurance context can be traced to the covenant of good faith and fair dealing"), and partially on Dodge v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 161 Ariz. 344, 346, 778 P.2d 1240, 1241
(1989) ("there is a legal duty implied in an insurance contract that the insurance company must act in good faith in dealing with its insured on a claim" (quoting Noble v.
National Am. Life Ins. Co., 128 Ariz. 188, 190, 624 P.2d 866, 868 (1981))). Loyal
Orderof Moose, Lodge 1392, 797 P.2d at 626-27.
110. Id. at 628.

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. (footnote omitted).
Id. at 628.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 629 n.18.
797 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1990).
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company's primary insured, Ryan Air, Inc. ("Ryan"). In February
1985, Clarence Douglas was killed by a landing Ryan aircraft while he
was crossing a closed portion of the Koyuk Airport on a snow
machine. On behalf of Ryan, Houston Casualty Company ("Hotiston"), entered into a settlement agreement with Douglas' estate.
Under the agreement, Houston gave the estate $200,000 outright and
made a $600,000 "loan" to the estate which would be repaid out of the
proceeds, if any, of an action by the estate against the Department of
Transportation (the "DOT") who operated the airport. When, in accordance with the terms of the settlement agreement, Douglas' estate
brought suit against the DOT for negligence in the design and maintenance of the airport, the DOT brought this action against Houston.' 16
The DOT contended that, under the terms of the insurance policy issued by Houston as required by the leases between Ryan and the
DOT, 117 Houston's denial of the DOT's request for defense was a
breach of contract and the arrangement with Douglas' estate was
invalid. I18
First, the supreme court held that, contrary to Houston's argument, the DOT was an "insured" under the policy issued to Ryan and
thus could claim coverage." 9 Nevertheless, absent a severability
116. Id. at 1201.
117. Id. Ryan had entered into a series of leases with the DOT to use DOT facilities at various airports in Alaska, however, there was no lease between Ryan and DOT
covering Koyuk Airport. Id. at 1202.
The leases required that Ryan obtain "'insurance to protect both [DOT] and
[Ryan] against comprehensive public liability, products liability (where applicable)
and property damage,' and to indemnify and hold DOT harmless for any injuries
'arising out of any acts of commission or omission by [Ryan], [Ryan's] agents, employees, or customers, or arising from or out of [Ryan's] occupation or use of the
Premises or privileges granted.'" Id. (quoting the lease agreements).
The lease agreements also required that the insurance policy waive Houston's
right of subrogation against the DOT. Id.
118. Id. at 1201. The DOT also argued that the "loan-receipt agreement" between
Houston and Douglas' estate impermissibly circumvented the underlying policies of
the Alaska Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The act provides, in part:
A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to
recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or
wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any
amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.16.010(d) (1983) (repealed 1987). The court did not reach this
issue in deciding the case. See infra note 123.
119. Houston Casualty, 797 P.2d at 1204. Even though the policy did not specify
the DOT as an "additional insured," the certificate of insurance clearly expressed the
parties' "objective, reasonable intention" that the coverage would extend to the DOT.
Id. The majority cited a number of cases holding that the absence of specific language
in an insurance policy will not alter the nature of the bargain obviously intended. Id.
The majority also noted that although there was no specific lease covering the
Koyuk facility, the policy's language defined "Premises or Operations covered" as "all
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clause in the policy, the DOT's coverage was co-extensive with

Ryan's. The court agreed with Houston that the "premises exclusion"
in the policy - which excluded coverage for bodily injury caused by
any aircraft owned or operated by Ryan - applied to all insureds, and
120
thus precluded the DOT's claim.
Even though the DOT could not claim coverage under the policy
for liability arising from Douglas' death, the majority agreed that the
DOT could enforce the "no subrogation" clause, but only if, on remand, the superior court found that Ryan was in fact covered for the
accident.12 1 If Ryan is covered, "Houston may not indirectly subrogate against the State a claim for which the State could reasonably
expect Ryan to be insured." 122 Should the superior court find that
Houston attempted improper subrogation, it should invalidate the
terms of23 the settlement agreement that require repayment of the

"loan."1

Concurring in the result, but criticizing the majority's analysis,
Chief Justice Matthews and Justice Burke took issue with the majority's interpretation of the term "aircraft of the insured" used in the
policy's "premises exclusion."' 24 The majority's reading the phrase to
mean "aircraft of the named insured [Ryan] or the additional insured
seeking coverage [DOT]," resulted in the exclusion being applied to
the DOT. Justice Matthews interpreted the phrase instead as "aircraft
of the insured seeking coverage," which - because the DOT did not
own the aircraft - would not have allowed the exclusion to apply to
the DOT. 25 The majority's narrower reading goes against the court's
airportpremises and operations within the State of Alaska. " Id. at 1203 (emphasis
added).
120. Id. at 1203-04. The "premises exclusion" applies only to coverage extended
under the "premises liability provision" of the policy. Id. at 1203. Although this
exclusion would presumably apply to Ryan as well as the DOT, the court held that:
"The proper inference on summary judgement is that Houston may have satisfied the
estate's claim against Ryan Air under the bodily injury or other provision of the policy" that did not contain an exclusion. Id. at 1204-05. Because the DOT did not seek
coverage under these other provisions of the policy at trial, it waived such an argument in the appeal. Id. at 1204 n.5.
121. Id. at 1204-05; see supra note 120 for a discussion of how Ryan might be
covered although DOT would not be, even though Ryan and DOT receive co-extensive coverage under the policy.
122. Id. at 1205 (citing Marathon Oil Co. v. Mid-Continent Underwriters, 786
F.2d 1301, 1304 (5th Cir. 1986)).
123. Id. at 1205 n. 11. In anticipation of such an outcome, the supreme court did
not address the issue of whether "loan-receipt agreements" were valid in the context
of joint tortfeasors. Id.; see supra note 118.
124. Id. at 1205-06 (Matthews, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Matthews agreed
with the result on the ground that the policy should not be construed to apply to
airports not covered by a lease between Ryan and the DOT. Id. at 1206.
125. Id. at 1205.

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

tradition of resolving ambiguities in insurance contracts in favor of
providing coverage and is contrary to the reasonable expectations of
12 6
the parties.
In Petersen v. Mutual Life Insurance Company,127 the final insurance case decided by the Alaska Supreme Court in 1990, the court
held that the trial judge had properly admitted evidence of the insured's failure to disclose alcoholism and a suicide attempt on his policy application.128 Based on this nondisclosure, Mutual Life
Insurance Company ("Mutual") denied plaintiff's claim for the proceeds of the policy although the insured died of a ruptured aorta, a
condition unrelated to either suicide or alcoholism. The supreme
court reasoned that the evidence of nondisclosure was admissible because Mutual would not have issued the policy had it known of these

facts. 129
B.

Securities

The court dealt with only one securities case in 1990. In Caucus
Distributors,Inc. v. State,130 the Alaska Supreme Court interpreted
Alaska's "blue sky" laws 131 to determine when notes are within the
statutory definition of covered "securities." 13 2
Caucus Distributors ("Caucus") was a not-for-profit corporation
incorporated in New York and engaged in distributing the works of
Lyndon LaRouche. 133 Caucus raised its funds through loans, contributions and sales of publications. Neither Caucus nor any of its agents
were registered with the Division of Securities pursuant to the Alaska
Securities Act.1 34 The litigation arose out of complaints by two
Alaska widowers, Thompson and Drew. 35 At a hearing before the
Division of Securities, the hearing officer found that Thompson and
126. Id. at 1205-06 (Matthews, C.J., concurring).
127. 803 P.2d 406 (Alaska 1990).
128. Id. at 409.

129. Id.
130. 793 P.2d 1048 (Alaska 1990).
131. ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.55.010-270 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
132. A "security" is defined as:
a note; ...

evidence of indebtedness; ...

investment of money or money's

worth including goods furnished or services performed in the risk capital of
a venture with the expectation of some benefit to the investor where the
investor has no direct control over the investment or policy decision of the
venture; or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a
"security"....
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.130(12) (1986).
133. CaucusDistrib., 793 P.2d at 1050-51.

134. Id. at 1051.
135. Id.
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Drew had made loans to Caucus believing the loans to be sound financial investments. 136 Based on this and other evidence, the hearing officer found the promissory notes executed in connection with the loans
to be securities within the meaning of the "blue sky" laws. 137 He also
found that Caucus' agents had misrepresented the nature of the trans-

action and had failed to disclose material facts 138 in violation of

Alaska Statutes section 45.55.010.139 The officer found that Caucus
4°
had failed to qualify for an exemption under section 45.55.140(a)(ii)1
because it had failed to file the required notice and documentation

with the Division of Securities.' 4 ' The Division ordered Caucus to
cease and desist from any further securities activity involving the offer
136. Id. at 1052.

137. Id.
138. Id. The officer found that the widowers were not given specific information
about management, revenue sources, or Caucus' current financial position. He also
found that the widowers were not told of the probability that neither interest on the
principal nor the principal itself would ever be repaid. Id.
139. The statute provides:
It is unlawful for a person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of a
security, directly or indirectly, to
(1) employ a device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(2) make an untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
light of the circumstances under which they are made, not misleading;
or
(3) engage in an act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon a person.
ALASKA STAT.

§ 45.55.010 (1986).

140. The statute provides in relevant part:
(a) The following securities are exempted from [Alaska Statutes section]
45.55.070:
(ii) a security issued by a person organized and operated not for private profit but exclusively for religious, educational, benevolent, charitable,
fraternal, social, athletic, or reformatory purposes, or as a chamber of commerce or trade or professional association ....
ALASKA STAT. § 45.55.140 (1986 & Supp. 1990).
141. The Code provides in relevant part:
The following governs exemptions under the Act relating to securities and
transactions:
(1) not-for-private-profit issuers shall file a notice with the administrator at least 15 days before making any offers or sales of securities; the
notice must contain a ruling or determination by the U.S. Internal Revenue Service recognizing the issuer's exempt status under section
501(c)(3) or 501(e) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (26 USC 501)
or other documentation the administrator may require including, but
not limited to, proposed offerring [sic] circular, certified financial statement, bylaws and articles of incorporation, plan of financing, plan of
operation, use of proceeds, background of officers and directors (or
principals if unincorporated) ....
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit.

3, § 08.910(1) (Supp. Jan. 1991).
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and sale of unregistered securities, and from any further fraudulent
behavior. 142 The superior court affirmed this order and Caucus appealed, arguing that the notes in question were not securities within
the meaning of Alaska's "blue sky" laws.' 43
The court, noting the analogous definitions of securities under the
state and federal law, reasoned that federal case law provided "a reasonable basis to conclude that an offering is a security within [Alaska
law]."' 144 Therefore, if the notes were securities under federal law,
then the heaiing officer could reasonably find that they were securities
under state law. 145
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 146 the United States Supreme Court
resolved the issue of how the federal securities statutes should be applied to notes. Reves requires the definition of a security to be interpreted broadly, 14 7 but sets forth a list of notes that are not considered
securities: notes for consumer financing, notes for mortgages on a
home, short-term notes secured by a business or its assets, character
loans to a bank customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment
of accounts receivable or notes formalizing an open-account debt incurred in the normal course of business. 148 The Reves test begins with
a presumption that every note is a security. 149 An issuer can rebut this
presumption if it can show that the note is on the exclusion list or that
it bears a "strong family resemblance" to a note on the list.150
In Caucus Distributors, the hearing officer applied the Reves test
and concluded that the notes issued by Caucus were securities. 15 1 The
Alaska Supreme Court agreed, finding that the notes issued to Thompson and Drew did not bear a resemblance to any of the commercial

transactions on the Reves list.152

142. Caucus Distrib., 793 P.2d at 1053.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. The Alaska Supreme Court dealt with the definition of a security in
American Gold & Diamond Corp. v. Kirkpatrick, 678 P.2d 1343, 1345-47 (Alaska
1984) and in Hentzner v. State, 613 P.2d 821, 823-24 (Alaska 1980). In both cases,
the court relied on federal securities cases to provide assistance in interpreting
Alaska's statutory provisions. CaucusDistrib., 793 P.2d at 1053.
146. -U.S.-, 110 S.Ct. 945 (1990). The Court followed the "literal" or "family
resemblance" test of the Second Circuit as articulated in Exchange National Bank of
Chicago v. Touche Ross & Co., 544 F.2d 1126, 1137 (2d Cir. 1976), modified, 726
F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984). Reves, -U.S. at -, 110 S.Ct. at 951.
147. Id. at , 110 S. Ct. at 949.
148. Id. at
110 S.Ct. at 951 (quoting Exchange Nat'l Bank, 554 F.2d at 1138).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. CaucusDistrib., 793 P.2d at 1055.
152. Id. at 1055-56.

1991]

YEAR IN REVIEW

Caucus further argued that, because it is a political organization,
the application of the "blue sky" laws to its fundraising efforts violated
the first amendment.153 The court rejected Caucus' contention that its
political purposes excuse fraudulent practices, holding that a "state
has a compelling interest in protecting the public from fraudulent
practices, even where the purpose underlying those fraudulent practices is protected by the First Amendment." 154 The court also rejected
Caucus' argument that the registration and disclosure requirements of
the "blue sky" laws were unduly burdensome to Caucus' political activities.15 5 The Alaska statute did not require divulgence of contributors' identities, but only divulgence of any borrower's identity and
concluded that these
proof of the method of repayment.1 56 The court
157
requirements passed constitutional scrutiny.
C.

Contracts

The Alaska Supreme Court dealt with a broad variety of contract
disputes during 1990. Perhaps most importantly, the court was twice
called upon to clarify its holding in State v. Northwestern Construction,
Inc., 15 8 in which the court permitted the limited use of Blue Book
rental rates to determine the cost of construction equipment usage.
A dispute over equipment damages was the focus in Southeast
Alaska Construction Co. v. State Departmentof Transportation.159 The
case arose out of a project to improve the airport runway in Ruby,
Alaska.16 ° The contractor ("SEACO"), unable to complete the project because of design and material problems, filed a claim against the
Department of Transportation ("DOT") for compensation for extra
61
work, and the DOT counterclaimed, seeking liquidated damages.1
The superior court ruled that the measure of SEACO's damages for
extra work should be its out-of-pocket expenses plus reasonable compensation for using SEACO-owned equipment, calculated at the actual bid rates rather than at Blue Book rates, as well as reasonable
amounts for overhead and profit. 162 The superior court also ruled that
153. Id. at 1057. See generally U.S. CONST. amend. I.
154. Caucus Distrib., 793 P.2d at 1057.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1058.
157. Id. The court compared the Alaska statute in question to a similar North
Carolina statute that the United States Supreme Court found unconstitutional in Riley
v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), and concluded that the statute
was sufficiently narrow in its requirements to be constitutional. Id.
158. 741 P.2d 235 (Alaska 1987).
159. 791 P.2d 339 (Alaska 1990).
160. Id.

161. Id. at 339-40.
162. Id. at 340.
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the DOT was entitled to liquidated damages for the period of time
between the extended contract deadline and the date on which a bankruptcy court deemed SEACO to have abandoned the contract.' 63 The
superior court entered final judgment for the DOT in the amount that
164
its liquidated damages exceeded SEACO's maximum damages.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's rulings.
In an earlier case, the court had approved an award of equipment
costs based on Blue Book rates. 165 The court held, however, that Blue
Book rates do not govern the determination of equipment costs unless
the contract specifically calls for such a measure. 166 Since this contract did not compel recovery at Blue Book rates, the court upheld the
superior court's decision to employ a different measure that more ac1 67
curately reflected the parties' intent.
The supreme court also upheld the partial summary judgment in
favor of the DOT on the issue of SEACO's damages. SEACO had
invited the DOT to calculate SEACO's expenses on the project, but
when later challenging the DOT's figures, SEACO failed to produce
specific evidence tending to call DOT's calculations into doubt. 168 Finally, as there were no genuine issues of material fact remaining as to
SEACO's liability, the court upheld the summary judgment enforcing
the contract's liquidated damages provision since it was enforceable
under the standard set forth in Arctic Contractors v. State. 169
FairbanksNorth StarBorough v. Kandik Construction, Inc.170 involved a contract for the construction of roads in a local subdivision.
Fairbanks North Star Borough ("Fairbanks") employed Roen Design
Associates, Inc. ("Roen") to prepare an environmental impact study
and a feasibility study, and also to survey and design roads for the
subdivision.1 7 1 Based on these plans, Fairbanks contracted with
Kandik Construction, Inc. & Associates ("Kandik") to clear, excavate
and develop the roads. Kandik encountered difficulty in performing
according to the plans and finally terminated the contract, citing
163. Id.
164. Id. at 341.
165. State v. Northwestern Constr. Inc., 741 P.2d 235, 237-38 (Alaska 1987).
166. Southeast Alaska Constr. Co., 791 P.2d at 341.
167. Id. at 341-42.
168. Id. at 343.
169. Id. (citing Arctic Contractors v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 49 (Alaska 1977) (Liquidated damages provisions are enforceable if the liquidated amount is a reasonable forecast of compensation for the harm caused by the breach and the harm caused is
difficult to assess accurately.)).
170. 795 P.2d 793 (Alaska 1990) (rehg granted, No. S-2772 (April 17, 1990) (on
Roen's petition only)).
171. Id. at 796.
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lack of cooperaRoen's defective design specifications and Fairbanks'
172
tion and failure to satisfy a payment deadline.
Kandik filed suit against Fairbanks for breach of express and implied warranties of design specifications, breach of the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and for business destruction resulting from
Kandik's loss of bonding capacity and damaged reputation. 173 Fairbanks counterclaimed, charging that Kandik breached the contract by
improperly disposing of organic waste and by failing to complete the
contract in a timely manner.1 74 At trial, the jury found that both
Kandik and Fairbanks had breached the contract, but only Kandik
had suffered damages from the breach. The jury175also concluded that
Roen was not required to indemnify Fairbanks.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the jury had been
properly instructed that Kandik could recover if it demonstrated its
reasonable reliance on the defective plans and specifications. 176 The
court reiterated that a project owner who furnishes plans and specifications to a contractor impliedly warrants their sufficiency, and the
additional expenses incurred as a
contractor is entitled to recover 1any
77
result of defective specifications.
The court did find, however, that the superior court committed
reversible error in allowing evidence of Kandik's total cost without
instructing the jury as to the specific damages recoverable for a breach
of contract. 178 While mathematical precision was not required,
Kandik could recover only those damages that were caused by the
faulty plans.1 79 Thus, while the total cost approach is a permissible
starting point for assessing damages, the plaintiff must still demonstrate that his increased costs were proximately caused by defendant's
breach.'8 0
The supreme court further ruled that the superior court had erred
in instructing the jury that Kandik could recover under a theory of
quantum meruit.18 ' When an express contract exists covering the
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 797.
176. Id. at 797-98.
177. Id. at 797 (citing Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, 523 P.2d 1243,
1246-47 (Alaska 1974), appeal after remand, 562 P.2d 1053 (Alaska 1977), aff'd on
rehearing,563 P.2d 883 (Alaska 1977)).
178. Id. at 798-99.
179. Id. at 798 (citing State v. Northwestern Const., 741 P.2d 235, 237 (Alaska

1987)).

180. Id. (citing U.S. Indus. v. Blake Constr. Co., 671 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1982);
F.H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 394 (Ct. Cl. 1955); Laburnum
Constr. Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 451 (Ct. Cl. 1963)).

181. Id. at 800.
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services in question, relief under a theory of quantum meruit is not
available.' 8 2 The jury instruction had failed to distinguish between
work within the scope of the original contract, for which Kandik
could not recover in quantum meruit, and work outside the scope of
the original contract, for which Kandik could conceivably have recovered. 183 Because of the superior court's errors regarding the total cost
approach and the instructions on quantum meruit, the supreme court
determined that Fairbanks was entitled to a new trial on the issue of

damages. 184
The court further found that the superior court erred in permitting the jury to award equipment costs to Kandik based on Blue Book
values rather than on prevailing costs in the Fairbanks area. 185 Here
again, the aggrieved party had relied on State v. Northwestern Construction, Inc. 186 As it had in Southeast Alaska Construction Co. v.
State, 187 the court held that Blue Book rates govern the determination
of equipment costs only if the contract specifically provides for such a
measure. 88 The contract here explicitly provided for just the opposite: the use of rates prevailing in the Fairbanks area. 189 By instructing the jury that it could consider either Blue Book or prevailing
rates, the superior court ignored an express contractual provision and
thus committed reversible error. 190
The supreme court dealt next with Kandik's business destruction
claim. The court ruled that the superior court properly permitted
Kandik Construction'91 to join the case as party plaintiff shortly
before trial, since Fairbanks had notice of the claim and adequate time
to prepare its defense. 192 The superior court erred in failing to instruct
the jury on the separate identities of Kandik and Kandik Construction, however, and in failing to advise the jury on the theory of liability. 193 In light of these deficiencies, the court reversed and remanded
194
the award of damages for the destruction of business.
182. Id. at 799 (citing Mitford v. de LaSala, 666 P.2d 1000, 1006 n.1 (Alaska
1983); B.B. & S. Constr. Co. v. Stone, 535 P.2d 271, 275 n.8 (Alaska 1975)).
183. Id. at 800.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. 741 P.2d 235, 237-38 (Alaska 1987).
187. 791 P.2d 339 (Alaska 1990); see supra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
188. Kandik Constr., 795 P.2d at 800.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 800.
191. Kandik Construction, Inc. & Associates ("Kandik") was "a joint venture
composed of Kandik Construction, Inc., and Carroll Vondra, Inc., d/b/a Yutan Construction Company." Id. at 796.
192. Id. at 802.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 803.
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Finally, the court turned to Fairbanks' indemnity claim against
Roen. Fairbanks claimed that principles of comparative fault apply to
common law indemnity claims between contracting parties. Roen, on
the other hand, argued that the jury had been properly instructed that
Fairbanks was entitled to indemnification only if it was completely
free from fault. 195 Declining to decide whether principles of comparative fault apply to contractual implied indemnity claims, the court
found that, since Fairbanks had argued causes of action against Roen
in both tort and contract, the indemnity claim added nothing to the
relief available.1 96 As such, the jury should have been permitted to
determine recovery under either or both of the tort and contract
theories.

197

In Estate of E. Donald Arbow v. Alliance Bank, 198 a loan of
$700,000 had been granted by Alliance Bank to Alaska Laser Knights,
Inc. ("ALK"), upon the condition that all of ALK's shareholders
guarantee the loan. Each of the shareholders agreed to guarantee the
loan personally on the assumption that ALK's president assumed similar obligations, but the president's close ties to the lender prohibited
the bank from accepting his personal guarantee.1 99 The supreme court
dismissed the shareholders' allegations of unilateral mistake, misrepresentation and statute of fraud violation as being without merit because
the court found that the president had executed a guaranty. 200 Restricting itself to interpreting the shareholder agreement, the court upheld a summary judgment ruling that all the individual guarantees
20 1
were binding.
In Zuelsdorf v. University of Alaska, Fairbanks2 2 the court addressed the contract rights of non-tenured faculty in state schools.
The plaintiffs' letters of appointment specified that their employment
would be governed by the university policies and regulations in force
at the date of the appointment. At the time the plaintiffs accepted
their appointments, the governing personnel regulation 20 3 entitled a
full-time tenure track assistant professor with three or more years of
service to fifteen months notice if her appointment was not to be renewed. Under this policy, the University was required to notify the
195. Id.
196. Id. at 804.

197. Id.
198. 790 P.2d 1343 (Alaska 1990).

199. Id. at 1344-45.
200. Id. at 1346 n.5.
201. Id. at 1345.
202. 794 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1990).

203. Id. at 933 n.1.
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plaintiffs of their termination by March 31, 1986 if it did not intend to
2°4
renew their contracts for the 1987-88 school year.
On December 12, 1985, the Board of Regents amended the policy
to require the University to notify an employee by June 30, 1986, if he
or she was not to be hired for the 1987-88 school year. While the
amendment was originally not to become effective until July 1, 1986, a
fiscal crisis led the Regents to advance the effective date to May 19,
1986.205 On May 19 and 23, 1986, plaintiffs were notified that they
would not be hired for the 1987-88 school year. Following a university grievance procedure and an administrative appeal, the aggrieved
professors commenced a civil suit against the University, asserting
that the University breached their employment contracts by failing to
provide timely notice under the personnel policy. The University
countered that notice was timely under the amended policy. 20 6 On
cross-motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor of the University, and the plaintiffs
20 7
appealed.
The supreme court found that the relationship between a university and its non-tenured faculty is governed by principles of contract
law. 20 8 The court also reaffirmed an earlier holding that a personnel
handbook promulgated by an employer can modify the terms of an atwill employment agreement. 20 9 In this case, the court held that the
University policies in force at the time of the plaintiffs' appointments
constituted a legally enforceable part of the employment contract, creating a vested right in the employees. 2 10 Since the University amended
its policy after notice was due to the plaintiffs under the policies at the
time of their appointment, the plaintiffs' right to employment in the
1987-88 school year had vested, and the superior court erred both in
entering summary judgment for the University and in refusing to enter
21
partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. '
204. Id. at 933.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 934.
207. Id. at 933.
208. Id. at 934.
209. Ia (citing Jones v. Central Peninsula Gen. Hosp., 779 P.2d 783 (Alaska
1989)). In Jones, the Alaska Supreme Court endorsed the reasoning of the Michigan
Supreme Court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980). Jones, 779 P.2d at 787. The Michigan court held that an employer statement of policy can create contractual rights in an employee even though such policies
were not negotiated and can be amended unilaterally by the employer without notice.
Toussaint, 408 Mich. at 613-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892. See also Perspective, Employment At Will in Alaska: The Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L. REV. 269,
277-79 (1989) (authored by Thomas P. Owens III).
210. Zuelsdorf, 794 P.2d at 935.
211. Id.
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The effect of a promissory note upon an estate was the central
issue in Jensen v. Ramras.2 12 The decedent, Dorothy Ramras, had
been a shareholder of Alaska Culinary Management, Inc. ("ACM"),
which was owned by a group of investors who had purchased a restau-

rant in 1985.213 To finance the purchase, the group signed a promisUnlimited, Inc., and
sory note in favor of the seller, Restaurants
214

entered into a cross-indemnity agreement.

Ramras died in 1986 and Restaurants Unlimited filed a contingency claim 21 5 against her estate for her liability as a co-maker of the
promissory note.2 16 The estate sought indemnification from the other
shareholders, and upon the shareholders' refusal to indemnify, the
estate filed suit. Anticipating a probate court order detailing the
shareholders' duty to perform under the agreement, the superior court
performance of the cross-indemnification
ordered 2specific
17
agreement.
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that the superior
court's order was premature and substantively flawed. Looking to the
plain, unambiguous language of the cross-indemnity agreement, the
212. 792 P.2d 668 (Alaska 1990).
213. Id. at 668.
214. Id. at 668-69. The agreement provided in relevant part:
If one or more of the undersigned is required to pay any portion of the debts
owed by the corporation for the purchase of [the restaurant], we agree that
each of us who pays less than his full proportionate share of such debt shall
indemnify the paying shareholder to the extent of that share, and pay on
demand the amount due to the indemnified shareholder. For the purposes of
this agreement a shareholder's "full proportionate share" is the same as his
percentage of the issued and outstanding stock of the corporation which he
owns .... (footnote omitted).
Id. at 669.
215. Restaurants Unlimited filed its claim pursuant to Alaska Statutes sections
13.16.460 and 13.16.495. The latter provides:
(a) If a claim which will become due at a future time or a contingent or
unliquidated claim becomes due or certain before the distribution of the estate, and if the claim has been allowed or established by a proceeding, it is
paid in the same manner as presently due and absolute claims of the same
class.
(b) In other cases the personal representative or, on petition of the personal
representative or the claimant in a special proceeding for the purpose, the
court may provide for payment as follows:
(1) if the claimant consents, the claimant may be paid the present or
agreed value of the claim, taking any uncertainty into account;
(2) arrangement for future payment, or possible payment, on the happening of the contingency or on liquidation may be made by creating a
trust, giving a mortgage, obtaining a bond or security from a distributee, or otherwise.
ALASKA STAT. § 13.16.495 (1990).
216. Jensen, 792 P.2d at 669.
217. Id. at 670.
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court found that the indemnification provision was triggered only
when the estate was actually required to pay a portion of the corporation's debt. 218 Here, there was no default and the estate had not been
required to pay anything. Therefore, the cause of action had not ripened, and might never ripen, making the lower court's order of specific
219
performance premature.
The supreme court also found that the lower court had misinterpreted Alaska Statutes section 13.16.495.220 Requiring the estate to
post security for a debt under the statute would not constitute a "payment" of the debt under the cross-indemnity agreement. 22 1 Until the
debtor defaults and Restaurants Unlimited executes its security, the
therefore the cross-inestate would. not need to make any payments;
222
demnity agreement would not be triggered.
In Helstrom v. North Slope Borough,223 the court confronted allegations of duress and unconscionability in a settlement agreement. In
February 1986, North Slope Borough suspended Helstrom from his
job as a mechanic because he falsified overtime hours. At a meeting
with the Borough District Attorney following his suspension, Helstrom was informed that the Borough intended to bring several claims

against

him.224

Helstrom's thrift account, controlled by the Borough,

property, effecwas frozen, and a later civil suit attached all personal
225
tively preventing Helstrom from leaving Barrow.
Helstrom later insisted to the district attorney that he needed to
settle the claims against him immediately so he could tend to a desperately ill daughter in Fairbanks. Helstrom then signed a confession of
judgment authorizing the Borough to cash in his thrift plan and to
keep all the tools seized by the Borough. 22 6 The confession of judgment also provided for liquidated damages if Helstrom breached any
part of the settlement and for indemnification of any claims against the
Borough arising out of the agreement. 22 7 The Borough reduced the
228
agreement to judgment shortly thereafter.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id.
Id.
See supra note 215.
Jensen, 792 P.2d at 670.
Id. at 670-71.
797 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 1194.
Id. at 1195.
Id.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
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After leaving Barrow, Helstrom moved to set aside the judgment
on the ground of duress.229 The superior court granted Helstrom's
motion, vacating the judgment and allowing the litigation to proceed
from the Borough's complaint. The Borough then amended its complaint, seeking specific enforcement of the liquidated damages provision of the agreement, and moved for summary judgment. The
superior court granted the Borough's motion, finding that Helstrom
230
had not established duress under Alaska law.

The supreme court reversed, citing a three-part standard for duress: "1) one party involuntarily accepted the terms of another, 2) circumstances permitted no other alternative and 3) such circumstances
were the result of coercive acts of the other party." 231 The court
found that Helstrom could satisfy the first two prongs by showing that
he had no "reasonable alternative," and that the existence of a "rea232
sonable alternative" was a question of fact for a jury.

The court then turned to Helstrom's allegation that the liquidated
damages provision was unconscionable. The court noted that on remand, Helstrom should be granted a motion for summary judgment
on this issue as it found the provision to be closer to a penalty clause
than to a true liquidated damages clause. 233 The court stated that "the
settlement agreement in this case appears to provide for 'liquidated
damages' on top of actual damages," and thus should be held uncon234
scionable on remand.
In 1990 the supreme court also addressed contracts in a bailment
context. In Gillen v. Holland2 35 the plaintiff obtained a contract with
the U.S. Army to install carpeting, and entered into a second contract
with the defendant to obtain the necessary carpet. When the carpet
was destroyed by fire in the defendant's warehouse, a dispute arose
over which party had assumed the risk of loss. While the defendant
admitted telling the plaintiff he was insured, he denied having promised to procure insurance or indemnify the plaintiff in the event of a
229. Id.; see ALASKA R. Civ. P. 60(b) (allowing court to relieve a party of a final
judgment for reasons justifying relief).
230. Helstrom, 797 P.2d at 1196-97. The court held that duress would void the
agreement only if Helstrom could demonstrate that he had "no reasonable alternative
to agreeing to the other party's terms, or as it is often stated, that he had no adequate
remedy if the threat were carried out." Id. (quoting Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc.
v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 584 P.2d 15, 22 (Alaska 1978)).
231. Id. at 1197 (quoting Totem Marine, 584 P.2d at 21).

232. Id. The adequacy of the alternative is determined by a practical standard
considering the victim's particular situation: the victim's belief is assessed subjectively
while the reasonableness of the alternative is judged by an objective standard. Id. at
1197-98.
233. Id. at 1200.
234. Id. (citing ArcticContractors v. State, 564 P.2d 30 (Alaska 1977)).
235. 797 P.2d 646 (Alaska 1990).
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lOSS. 236 Amidst considerable confusion over the pleadings, the superior court held that the plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed his bailment
claim and had failed to make out a prima facie case for breach of the
insurance contract. 2 37 The court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment and issued a final judgment in his favor.238
The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding that the superior
court misconceived the nature of the plaintiff's cross-claim, that the
plaintiff had never intended to dismiss its bailment claim, and that the
defendant was liable for loss of goods as the bailee. 239 In examining
the bailment claim, the court noted that it had earlier recognized the
right of the parties in a bailment contract to shift liability, either by
express contractual agreement or by implication, if one party agreed to
provide full insurance coverage for the benefit of both parties. 24° In
the present case, the defendant admitted that his insurance was intended to benefit both parties. 24 1 By assuming the responsibility of
24 2
insuring the goods, Holland thus assumed the risk of their lOSS.
In Donnybrook Building Supply v. Interior City Branch, FirstNationalBank,243 the defendant bank ("ICB") approved three home construction loans to Executive Builders, a construction firm, that
obtained some of its building supplies from the plaintiff Donnybrook. 244 When Executive Builders received the loan funds from ICB,
it used part of the money to pay Donnybrook for outstanding debt
incurred by Executive Builders on previous projects financed by
ICB. 245 Following a dispute over payment, Donnybrook issued a
stop-payment order2 46 to ICB, but ICB continued to disburse loan
236. Id. at 647.
237. Id. at 648.
238. Id.
239. Id. at (49-50.
240. Id. at 650 (citing Dresser Indus. v. Foss Launch & Tug Co., 560 P.2d 393, 395
(Alaska 1977)).
241. Id.
242. Id. The court further noted that in bailment situations
a party does not have to establish an agreement to insure in order to shift the
risk of loss of the goods. A bailor or a bailee's agreement to purchase insurance for the benefit of both parties is sufficient to shift to it the risk of loss for
the bailed goods.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
243. 798 P.2d 1263 (Alaska 1990).
244. Id. at 1265.
245. Id.
246. Id. The court noted that then-Alaska Statutes section 34.35.062(a)(2)
authorized:

a construction materials supplier to issue a stop-payment notice to financiers
after twenty days where the project's financing is not at least 50% bonded
and the builder falls thirty days in arrears if there is no payment due date, or
more than twenty days late where the contract specifies a payment due date.
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funds to Executive Builders. 24 7 All three parties entered into a written
agreement clarifying Executive Builders' obligation to Donnybrook,
but ICB refused to guarantee Executive Builders' payment. 248 Within
a few months, Executive Builders filed for bankruptcy and Donnybrook sued ICB. At trial, the superior court held that ICB's representations to Donnybrook concerning Executive Builders' financial
condition were negligent rather than intentional, that the misrepresentations were not material breaches, and that the agreement among the
three parties did not guarantee that ICB would pay Donnybrook for
lost profits. 24 9 The superior court further held that Donnybrook had
received more from Executive Builders' in the form of profits from the
sale of one of the homes built than it would have received from dam250
ages on its stop-payment claim.
On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the superior
court did not err in finding ICB's breaches of the agreement immaterial.251

Donnybrook claimed that ICB had warranted as correct the

erroneous information it provided on Executive Builders and that ICB
allowed payments and claims in violation of the agreement by shifting
funds among three ongoing projects.25 2 The court held that, in the
absence of an explicit guarantee in the agreement, ICB did not warrant
that the information provided therein would be correct. 253 The court
254
noted that ICB had explicitly refused to make such a guarantee.
The supreme court also found that the trial court had relied on sufficient evidence in finding that ICB's account-shuffling did not materially contribute to the non-completion of the projects. 255
A lender who disburses loan funds despite a stop-payment notice becomes
liable for the amount disbursed or the actual debt, whichever is less.
Id. at 1265 n.1 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.062(a)(2) (1990) (amended 1986)).
The court also noted that then-Alaska Statutes section 34.35.062 (a)(5) provided
that "[s]ums withheld under a stop-payment notice may not be disbursed by the
lender except under the terms of a written agreement signed by the claimant, owner
and general contractor or by order of a court of competent jurisdiction." Id. at 1265
n.2 (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 34.35.062(a)(5) (1990) (amended 1986)).
247. Id. at 1265.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1266.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 1267.
254. Id. In considering the absence of the rejected terms in the agreement, the
court relied on Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214(c) (1981) and on its earlier
holding in Alaska Diversified Contractors v. Lower Kuskokwim School Dist., 778
P.2d 581, 584 (Alaska 1989), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 725 (1990).
255. Donnybrook, 798 P.2d at 1266-67.
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The court also rejected Donnybrook's attempt to recover on an
equitable theory, restating the position of the Alaska courts that equitable relief is not available when there is an adequate remedy at law. 25 6
Finally, the court held that the superior court had not abused its discretion when it awarded ICB attorney's fees and costs even though
ICB's application for such was untimely. 257
The final contracts case, Sea Lion Corp. v. Air Logistics 258 involved corporate ratification of a contract signed by an agent. The
president of the defendant company, Air Logistics, signed an agreement to provide flight service to the plaintiff, Sea Lion Corp., despite
the fact that the president was without authority as the corporation's
agent to sign the agreement. The court held that Air Logistics was
bound by the agreement in light of its failure to disavow the agreement
promptly after learning of the president's act. 25 9 The court held that
formal approval of the agent's actions by the board of directors was
not necessary; acquiescence was sufficient to bind the corporation. 260
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In the area of constitutional law, the Alaska Supreme Court decided only two cases in 1990. In an equal protection case, the court
employed a familiar sliding scale analysis, and focused on the state
rather than the federal constitutional claims because Alaska's equal
protection clause affords individuals a higher degree of protection than
does its federal counterpart. The second case discussed the press' right
of access to public documents. The court required release of all the
documents involved, noting the public's fundamental right of access to
the documents.
In Sonneman v. Knight,26 1 a postal service employee who resigned
his position to begin law school was denied unemployment benefits by
the Employment Security Division of the Department of Labor
("ESD"). The ESD denied the benefits on the ground that voluntarily
leaving work to attend school is not "good cause" under Alaska Statutes section 23.20.379. The ESD also denied the benefits on the
ground that law school is not vocational school under Alaska Statutes
section 23.20.382, attendance at which would not render him ineligible
256. Id. at 1268 (citing Knaebel v. Heiner, 663 P.2d 551, 553 (Alaska 1983)).
257. Id. The court noted that Alaska Civil Rule 94 permits some latitude. The
rule provides that "[t]hese rules are designed to facilitate business and advance justice.
They may be relaxed or dispensed with by the court in any case where it shall be
manifest to the court that a strict aderence [sic] to them will work injustice." ALASKA
R. CIv. P. 94.
258. 787 P.2d 109 (Alaska 1990).
259. Id. at 119.
260. Id. at 118.
261. 790 P.2d 702 (Alaska 1990).
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for benefits, but is instead academic training under Alaska Statutes
section 23.20.378, attendance at which would render him ineligible for
benefits. The plaintiff's claim that distinguishing between vocational
and academic training for the purpose.of unemployment benefits viothe
lated the equal protection and due process clauses was rejected by2 62
constitutions.
state
and
federal
the
under
Court
Supreme
Alaska
The court analyzed the equal protection issue under the state constitution's "sliding scale" test, which had been adopted in State v. Er264
ickson 2 63 and refined in Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Brown.
Under this test, the state had shown that the distinction between vocational and academic training bears a fair and substantial relationship
to the Employment Security Act's purpose of assisting the least employable among Alaska's population. 265 The court also found no substantive due process violation because of this legitimate purpose of the
an "institution of
Act. 266 Finally, the court found that law school is
267
school."
"vocational
a
not
and
education"
higher
Municipality of Anchorage v. AnchorageDaily News, 268 the second
constitutional case decided by the supreme court in 1990, involved
three consolidated appeals relating to the Anchorage Daily News' requests for certain municipality documents. Despite the fact that the
appeals were mooted by the publication of the requested documents,
the matter under the "public interest" exthe court agreed to review
269
ception to mootness.
In the first case, the municipality appealed a court order requiring
the release of employee performance evaluations by the Anchorage Library Advisory Board ("Library Board"). The Alaska Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court, ruling that the Library Board was a public
entity acting in an official capacity. 270 Therefore, its report was a public record to which the Anchorage Daily News was entitled access
under the Alaska Public Records Act 27 1 and the Open Meetings
Act. 272

262. Id. at 704.
263. 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978).
264. 687 P.2d 264, 269 (Alaska 1984).
265. Sonneman, 790 P.2d at 706.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 707.
268. 794 P.2d 584 (Alaska 1990).
269. Id. at 588. For applications of the public interest exception to mootness, see
Falke v. State, 717 P.2d 369, 371 (Alaska 1986) and Kentopp v. Anchorage, 652 P.2d
453, 457-58 (Alaska 1982).
270. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d at 589.
271. Act of Jan. 1, 1963, ch. 101, 1962 Alaska Sess. Laws 89 (codified as amended
at ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.25.110-120 (1983)).
272. Act of Aug. 31, 1972, ch. 98, 1972 Alaska Sess. Laws 1 (codified as amended
at ALASKA STAT. §§ 44.62.310-312 (1989)).
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In the second case, the municipality appealed the lower court's
order that the municipality disclose a Fiscal Policy Committee report.
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling, holding
that the Blue Ribbon Fiscal Panel was a municipal agency subject to
the public records disclosure laws. 273 The court also noted that the
public had a fundamental right of access to such governmental
records, in contrast with the municipality's de minimis interest in
274
keeping the records confidential.
In the final case, the Anchorage Daily News appealed the lower
court's o;der permitting the municipality to depose certain Daily
News employees as a prerequisite to the government's release of the
Blue Ribbon Fiscal Report. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the
lower court, holding that a governmental agency is not entitled to delay access to public documents through the use of depositions where it
has failed to present a prima facie defense to the release. 275 The municipality here had failed to present such a prima facie defense. 276
V.

CRIMINAL LAW

The Alaska Supreme Court decided only four criminal law cases
during 1990, three of which concerned the rights of defendants in
drunk driving cases. The fourth case concerned the need for a criminal defendant to testify in order to preserve for review a claim of improper impeachment by prior conviction.
The Alaska Supreme Court first recognized the due process right
to challenge breath test results in Lauderdale v. State.277 There, the
court held that due process bars the introduction into evidence of
breath test results, unless the police give defendants a reasonable opportunity to challenge the results through independent testing. 278 The
issue in Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage279 was whether notice
of the right to an independent test combined with a simultaneous offer
of assistance in obtaining the test is a constitutionally adequate substitute for preserving the breath test sample for later testing by the
defendant.
The officer who administered Gundersen's breathalyzer test read
him a "Notice of Right to an Independent Test," but Gundersen told
273. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d at 592.
274. Id. at 593.
275. Id. at 593-94; see Doe v. Alaska Superior Court, 721 P.2d 617, 626 (Alaska
1986) (the entity claiming the privilege has the initial burden of presenting evidence
justifying denial of release of public documents).
276. Anchorage Daily News, 794 P.2d at 594.
277. 548 P.2d 376 (Alaska 1976).
278. Id. at 381.
279. 792 P.2d 673 (Alaska 1990).
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103

the officer he did not wish to have his own independent test.280 Emphasizing that "clear and express" notice of the right to independent
testing is required, the court concluded that Gundersen's due process
rights had not been violated because the procedure used by the arresting officer was an adequate substitute for breath sample preservation. 2 1 Gundersen's waiver was effective despite his intoxication, so
long as "'he knew what he was doing.' "282 The court upheld Gun2 83
dersen's conviction.
In Zsupnik v. State,284 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the
defendant's drunk driving conviction. The defendant had been arrested and brought to the police station for driving while intoxicated.
During a twenty minute observation period before the administration
of a breath test, the police refused the defendant's four requests to
telephone her uncle. 285 The court held that Alaska Statutes section
12.25.150(b) 28 6 unambiguously gives a prisoner the right to telephone
immediately both relatives and an attorney. 28 7 The court specifically
rejected the balancing test employed by the lower court, which
280. Id. at 674. The text of the "Notice of Right to an Independent Test" reads:
You are.., under arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated. You
have provided a sample of your breath for analysis on the Intoximeter 3000.
You also have a right to obtain an independent test of your blood alcohol
level. If you wish to have an independent test you will be transferred to a
local medical facility where a sample of your blood will be drawn by qualified personnel at no charge to you. The blood sample will be stored at the
medical facility for a period of 60 days. It will be your responsibility to
make arrangements for analysis of your blood sample. The analysis itself
will be done at your own expense. At this time you must decide whether or
not you want an independent test performed. A refusal to decide will be
taken [as] a waiver of your right to obtain an independent test.
Id.
281. Id. at 677 (citing Municipality of Anchorage v. Serrano, 649 P.2d 256 (Alaska
Ct. App. 1982)). The dissent would require the state to preserve all breath samples for
a defendant's later use because "[iun cases where intoxication is an essential element of
the crime charged, such as driving while intoxicated, the probability of an involuntary
waiver of the accused's due process rights is high." Id. at 679 (Burke, J.,dissenting).
282. Id. at 677 (quoting Thessen v. State, 454 P.2d 341, 345 (Alaska 1969)).
283. Id. at 678.
284. 789 P.2d 357 (Alaska 1990).
285. Id. at 358.
286. The statute sets forth the rights of prisoners after arrest:
Immediately after an arrest, a prisoner shall have the right to telephone or
otherwise communicate with the prisoner's attorney and any relative or
friend, and any attorney at law entitled to practice in the courts of Alaska
shall, at the request of the prisoner or any relative or friends of the prisoner,
have the right to immediately visit the person arrested.
ALASKA STAT.

§ 12.25.150(b) (1990).

287. Zsupnik 789 P.2d at 360.
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weighed the defendant's right to communication against the state's interest in acquiring a prompt and reliable breath test. 2 8 The supreme
court found that talking with a friend or relative would not jeopardize
the state's interest and was required by the plain language of the statute; thus, the results of the breath test were tainted and had to be
28 9
excluded at retrial.
The Alaska Supreme Court considered the effect of previous convictions for driving while intoxicated on the plaintiff's license revocation in Wik v. State.2 90 Wik had been arrested for DWI in September
of 1987 and convicted in December of 1987. Wik argued that under
Alaska Statutes section 28.15.181291 the date of conviction should be
used to determine if within the preceding ten years he had been convicted of a similar offense, while the Department of Motor Vehicles
interpreted the statute using the date of arrest, thereby requiring a ten
year revocation of his license. The court noted that the issue was one
of statutory interpretation: "what date does [section 28.15.181] contemplate in calculating whether a person convicted of DWI or refusal
to submit to a breathalyzer test has been previously convicted of a
similar offense ...in the preceding ten years."' 292 The supreme court
ruled that the date of the latest arrest, rather than the latest conviction, should be used in this calculation. 293 Therefore Wik's DWI conviction of October 1977 required a ten year revocation of his license.
The supreme court held in State v. Wickham 294 that a criminal
defendant must testify at trial in order to preserve for review the denial
of his in limine motion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction for
288. Id.
289. Id. at 361. The court rejected the state's argument that Zsupnik's sole remedy
should be criminal sanctions against the arresting officer. Id.; see ALASKA STAT.
§ 12.25.150(c) (1990) (providing for the possibility of criminal sanctions for violations

of § 12.25.150(b) rights).
290. 786 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1990).
291. The statute provides that license privileges cannot be granted during the following periods:
(2) not less than one year if, within the preceding 10 years, the person has
been previously convicted of one offense
(A) described in (a)(5) [(driving while intoxicated)] or (8)[(refusal to
submit to a chemical test)] ...
(3) not less than 10 years if, within the preceding 10 years the person has
been previously convicted of more than one of following offenses or has more
than once been previously convicted of one of the following offenses:
(A) an offense described in (a)(5) or (8) of this section ...
ALASKA STAT. § 28.15.181 (1989).
292. Wik, 786 P.2d at 385 (footnote omitted).
293. Id. at 387.
294. 796 P.2d 1354 (Alaska 1990).
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In doing so, the court adopted the holding
of Luce v. United States,296 despite the fact that Luce is not binding on
the states. 297 The Supreme Court's unanimity in Luce, and the
number of other states that have adopted the Luce rule, persuaded the
Alaska Supreme Court to follow suit.298 The purpose of the Luce rule
is to create concrete records for use by the appellate courts in reviewing the trial court decisions to admit evidence of prior convictions for
purposes of impeachment. 299 The court reasoned that the "factual
vacuum" caused by the absence of a defendant's testimony created an
unacceptable level of speculation in making a determination of
o
error.3
The court chose, however, to adopt the Luce rule prospectively,
and therefore permitted review of Wickham's case despite his decision
not to testify.30 1 The court reasoned that defendants like Wickham
might have "altered their trial tactics had they known that Luce
30° 2
would become law."
impeachment

purposes.

VI.

EMPLOYMENT LAW

The Alaska Supreme Court decided many cases in employment
law during 1990. The field has been divided into three subcategories:
wrongful discharge, workers' compensation, and miscellaneous issues
including the respondeat superior doctrine, comparable worth, unfair
labor practice and arbitration.
A. Wrongful Discharge
Two wrongful discharge cases were decided by the supreme court
in 1990. In one, the court continued the trend noted in 1989's Year in
Review toward "preserv[ing] or expand[ing]" the rights of discharged
employees. 30 3 In the second case, a matter of statutory interpretation,
the court followed a literal interpretation of the relevant statute,
3 °4
thereby precluding plaintiff's recovery.
295. Id. at 1358.
296. 469 U.S. 38 (1984).
297. Because the Supreme Court adopted the Luce rule pursuant to its advisory
power, the rule is not binding on the states. Wickham, 796 P.2d at 1357 (citing People
v. Collins, 42 Cal. 3d 378, 385, 722 P.2d 173, 177, 228 Cal. Rptr. 899, 903 (1986)).
298. Id. at 1357 & n.5.
299. Id. at 1359.

300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 1358.
Id. at 1359.
Id.
7 ALASKA L. Rv. 87, 118 (1990).

304. For an analysis of Alaska law in the area of wrongful discharge, see Perspective, Employment at Will in Alaska: The Question of Public Policy Torts, 6 ALASKA L.
RaV. 269 (1989) (authored by Thomas P. Owens III); Perspective, Shelterfrom the
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In Beard v. Baum, 30 5 a former employee of the State Department
of Transportation ("DOT") alleged constructive wrongful discharge,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, denial of due process, defamation and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he was pressured
to resign after making public allegations of corruption within the
DOT.30 6 The superior court dismissed the first three claims on the
grounds that the employee was first required to exhaust his remedies
under his collective bargaining agreement, and granted summary judgment for the defendants on the latter two. 30 7 The Alaska Supreme
Court reversed the lower court on the issues of wrongful discharge and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, holding that the plaintiff
was excused from exhausting his contractual remedies since, as he
could not procure the required representation of his union representative, such remedies were clearly futile.308 The court upheld the dismisargument that
sal of plaintiff's due process claim, rejecting the
30 9
plaintiff was entitled to a pre-termination hearing.
On the issue of defamation, the supreme court upheld summary
judgment for the state, finding that the plaintiff had become a public
figure by seeking out the press to make his allegations of corruption,
but had failed to prove the requisite "actual malice" on the part of his
supervisor. 3 10 The court reversed the superior court's grant of summary judgment on the section 1983 action, however, holding that
under the balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Pickering v. Board of Education,3 11 the plaintiff's criticism of the
DOT was a matter of public concern and therefore protected
3 12
speech.
In Zoerb v. Chugach Electric Association, Inc.,313 the plaintiff alleged that his employer's decision to terminate him was made at a
closed meeting in violation of the open meeting requirements of
Alaska Statutes section 10.25.175 and that the jury was improperly
Storm: The Need for Wrongful DischargeLegislation in Alaska, 6 ALASKA L. REV.
321 (1989) (authored by Mark A. Redmiles).
305. 796 P.2d 1344 (Alaska 1990).
306. Id. at 1347.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 1349.
309. Id. at 1350.
310. Id. at 1353.
311. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
312. Beard, 796 P.2d at 1352. The Pickering balancing test has been defined by the
Alaska Supreme Court to be as follows: "[A] government employer [may] limit the
First Amendment rights of an employee only if it can demonstrate that its legitimate
interest in promoting efficiency in its operation outweighs the interests of the employee
in commenting upon matters of public concern." Id. at 1351 (quoting Wickwire v.
State, 725 P.2d 695, 700 (Alaska 1986)).
313. 798 P.2d 1258 (Alaska 1990).
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instructed as to "good cause" for his firing. 314 The Alaska Supreme
Court held that he lacked standing to bring a claim under Alaska Statutes section 10.25.175, which governs the procedures of electrical cooperatives and requires that meetings of the board of directors be open
to members of the cooperative. 31 5 The court found that the plaintiff
was an employee, not a member, of the cooperative, and that employees were ineligible to attend the board meetings. 31 6 The court further
held that the trial court's instructions adequately informed the jury
that it was to consider the true motivation behind the plaintiff's dismissal in concluding that the plaintiff was terminated for "good
cause." 3 17
B.

Workers' Compensation

Twelve supreme court decisions - the bulk of the employment
law cases decided this past year - concerned workers' compensation.
As is customary, the cases here are discussed in the order in which the
issues presented would be encountered by a practitioner in the course
of a typical case: scope of liability, benefit calculation, exclusivity of
workers' compensation as a remedy, employers' offsets based on recovery from a third party and reimbursement of health insurance companies under the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act.
The initial and fundamental inquiry that a practitioner must
make in a workers' compensation case is whether an employment relationship exists at all. The issue decided in Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United
PaperworkersInternationalUnion3 18 was whether the claimant had an
employer-employee relationship with the union while striking and
picketing against his employer. While receiving temporary total disability benefits for a work-related back injury, the plaintiff participated
in picketing activity against his employer, during which he suffered a
heart attack. The plaintiff then applied for permanent total disability,
based only on his previous back injury. The defendant claimed that
the plaintiff's heart attack was a subsequent intervening injury which
occurred while the plaintiff was employed by the union, thus making
the union responsible for workers' compensation under the "last injurious exposure" rule. 319 Relying on a 1989 decision of the Alaska
314. Id. at 1259; see ALASKA STAT. § 10.25.175 (1989).
315. Zoerb, 798 P.2d at 1261.
316. Id. at 1260-61.
317. Id. at 1263.
318. 791 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1990).
319. Id. at 1009. "The last injurious exposure rule applies when work for successive employers combines to produce an employee's disability. The rule imposes full
liability on the most recent employer." Id. at 1009 n.2 (citing 4 A. LARSON, THE
LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

§ 95.20 (1986)).
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Supreme Court,320 the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board
("Board") found no employer-employee relationship between the
claimant and the union since there was no express or implied employment contract.3 2 1 In considering the circumstances of the employeeunion relationship, as required by Childs, the court accepted the
Board's finding that strike benefits are not compensation: the benefits
were not paid in proportion to the amount of time spent in the picket
line, but were a flat weekly benefit paid to everyone on strike. 322 Further, in the absence of a contract, the court upheld the Board's decision not to apply the "relative nature of the work" test to determine
employment status,3 23 reasoning that this test is used only to distinonce an emguish between employees and independent contractors
3 24
ployment relationship has already been established.
In Robinett v. Enserch Alaska Construction and Employers Casualty Co.,325 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the Board's decision
against the plaintiff. The court found that the Board erred in applying
the "Larson test ' 3 26 retroactively to the plaintiff's actions since the
statute does not provide for the application of the test to injuries suffered before July 1, 1988.327 Under this test, "an employee's willful
and knowing false representations of his or her physical condition may
bar recovery of statutory workers' compensation. 3 28 The court declined to infer that the statute was intended to bar the plaintiff's claim,
despite his deliberate misrepresentations on a pre-employment medical
questionnaire. 329 The Board also erred in finding that the plaintiff's
evidence failed to establish the necessary preliminary link between his
employment and his injury. 330 The court ruled that the threshold
320. Childs v. Kalgin Island Lodge, 779 P.2d 310 (Alaska 1989).
321. Alaska Pulp Corp., 791 P.2d at 1010 (citing Childs, 779 P.2d at 313).
322. Id.
323. The court adopted this test in Kroll v. Reeser, 655 P.2d 753 (Alaska 1982) to
"distinguish between employees and independent contractors for the purpose of determining whether an individual is an 'employee,' and thus eligible for workers' compensation benefits, under the Act." Kroll, 655 P.2d at 755.
324. Alaska Pulp Corp., 791 P.2d at 1012 (citing Kroll, 655 P.2d 753, 755 (Alaska
1982)).
325. 804 P.2d 725 (Alaska 1990).

326. Id. at 727 (citing IC A. LARSON,

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW

§ 47.53,

393-94 (1986)). The "Larson test" was used by the Board in analyzing Robinett's
responses to the employee questionnaire. Id. The test has been essentially codified at
Alaska Statutes section 23.30.022. Id.
327. Id. at 727-29.
328. Id. at 727.
329. Id. at 728.
330. Id. at 729.
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showing for this link is minimal, requiring only 33"some
evidence," and
1
that the plaintiff had met this minimal burden.
In Hagel v. King Steel, Inc.,332 the supreme court affirmed a decision by the Board that plaintiff had not suffered a new injury while
employed by the defendant. Plaintiff, an iron worker, suffered a compensable back injury in a previous job and returned to work against
the advice of his doctor. While employed by the defendant, plaintiff
claimed to have suffered a new injury during a fall. The Board and the
court rejected his claim, ruling that he had neither received a new injury nor aggravated the pre-existing injury. 333 The court affirmed the
Board's application of the "last injurious exposure" rule. 334 Under
this rule, King Steel would be responsible for Hagel's compensation
only if employment with King Steel "aggravated, accelerated, or combined with" his pre-existing condition and, if so, the aggravation was a
"legal cause" of Hagel's disability. 335 Under Alaska Statutes section
23.20.120(a)(1), in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary,
such aggravation must be presumed. The Board found tflat King Steel
then produced "substantial evidence" to overcome the presumption
Hagel then failed to
that it was responsible for compensation, and
336
show that he suffered a compensable injury.
In Cortay v. Silver Bay Logging,337 the supreme court ruled that
an employee was improperly denied temporary total disability benefits.
The plaintiff-worker was denied benefits because he had cared for his
sick wife during the time he was unable to work due to his disability.
Relying on Estate of Ensley v. Anglo Alaska Construction,Inc.,338 the
court held that a disabled employee should not be denied disability
benefits simply because he chooses to engage in an activity that renders him unavailable for work. 339 Although Estate of Ensley involved
unavailability for work due to medical reasons, the court reasoned that
the same remedial policy of the Workers' Compensation Act governed
this case.34° The court also held that in order to ensure competent
counsel for injured workers in the future, claimants seeking disability
331. Id. at 728. The court noted that the testimony of Robinett's co-workers as to
their observations of Robinett's condition before and after the alleged injury was sufficient to meet this burden. Id.
332. 785 P.2d 1207 (Alaska 1990).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1209; see supra note 319.
335. Hagel, 785 P.2d at 1209 (quoting Ketchikan Gateway Borough v. Saling, 604
P.2d 590, 596 (Alaska 1979)).

336. Id.
337. 787 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).
338. 773 P.2d 955, 959-60 (Alaska 1989).
339. Cortay, 787 P.2d at 108.

340. Id.
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full reasonable attorney's fees rather than the statutory
should receive
34 1
minimum.
In Metcalf v. Felec Services,342 the plaintiff was denied workers'
compensation payments after refusing treatment for headaches suffered after a work-related accident. The supreme court affirmed the
Board's finding that refusal of treatment in this case was unreasonable,
but held that the Board had overstepped its authority when it permitted the defendant-carrier to suspend payments to the plaintiff before
the Board issued an order. 34 3 While the Board may suspend future
payments to a claimant, it cannot retroactively suspend payments of
344
benefits.
In Lake v. ConstructionMachinery, Inc., 345 the supreme court addressed whether, in the case of an injured employee, the employer is
one of the parties among whom the finder of fact must allocate fault
pursuant to the rule of modified joint and several liability found in
Alaska Statutes section 09.17.080. The court ruled that evidence of
the employer's negligence was relevant, but the court limited the use
of such evidence by the jury solely to prove that the employer was
either entirely at fault or the employer's fault was a superseding cause
of the injury. 34 6 Since the statute does not explicitly include statutorily immune employers in the group among whom total liability must
be allocated, the court refused to alter the statutory scheme governing
employers' rights and liabilities for workplace accidents. 347 Therefore,
the court was willing to admit evidence of an employer's negligence
only when a third party tortfeasor seeks to prove that the employer
was completely at fault or that the employer's negligence was a superseding cause of the accident. 348 The finder of fact may thus allocate all
but cannot allocate a portion
or none of the total fault to the employer,
349
of the total fault to the employer.
In Wrangell Forest Products v. Alderson, 350 the only 1990 case
discussing the mathematical calculation of disability benefits, the
supreme court affirmed the Board's award of benefits based on the injured worker's salary during the period immediately preceding his injury, rather than on the previous two years as is normally done.
341. Id. at 108-09 (relying on Wise Mechanical Contractors v. Bignell, 718 P.2d
971, 973 (Alaska 1986)); see ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.145(a) (1990).
342. 784 P.2d 1386 (Alaska 1990).
343. Id. at 1388-89.
344. Id. at 1388.
345. 787 P.2d 1027 (Alaska 1990).
346. Id. at 1031.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. 786 P.2d 916 (Alaska 1990).
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Alaska Statutes section 23.30.220(a)(2) permits such a calculation
when the usual method of averaging the employee's income over the
previous two years would produce an inequitable result. 35 1 In a series
of cases beginning with Johnson v. RCA-OMS, Inc.,352 the court recognized the availability of this alternative method of calculation. The
court here agreed that the Board had appropriately used this alternative method in light353of the employee's inability to work during part of
the last two years.
In 1990, the supreme court twice rejected employers' arguments
that workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for injured workers. In King v. Brooks,354 the court ruled that the lower court erred in
granting summary judgment in an employment case where the plaintiff charged intentional infliction of emotional distress by his supervisor. 355 The court held that workers' compensation is not the exclusive
remedy "'when an employee commits an intentional tort on a fellow
worker.' 356 Whereas the lower court ruled the harassment insufficient to subject the defendant to liability, the supreme court ruled that
summary judgment was improper as a question of fact existed whether
357
the harassment was sufficiently severe.
Department of Public Safety v. Brown 358 arose when a state employee injured on a state vessel brought suit against the state alleging
liability under the Jones Act 359 for the negligence of the vessel's
master and under the admiralty doctrines of unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure.360 The employee had already received state workers'
compensation benefits. The court held that the Workers' Compensation Act is exclusive as to state claims only, and therefore the
claimant
361
was entitled to pursue a federal maritime remedy as well.
In Gossett v. Era Meyeres Real Estate,362 the plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim against his employer and a tort action against
third-party defendants for injuries sustained in the same accident. The
351. Id. at 917.
352. 681 P.2d 905 (Alaska 1984).
353. Wrangell, 786 P.2d at 918.

354. 788 P.2d 707 (Alaska 1990).
355. Id. at 711.
356. Id. at 709 (quoting Elliot v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Alaska 1977)).

357. Id. at 711.
358. 794 P.2d 108 (Alaska 1990).
359. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988).
360. Brown, 794 P.2d at 109. The court disregarded the state's sovereign immunity

claim, relying on the Claims Against the State Act, ALASKA

STAT.

§ 09.50.250 (Supp.

1990), and State v. Stanley, 506 P.2d 1284, 1290-91 n.9 (Alaska 1973). Brown, 794

P.2d at 109-10.
361. Id. at 110.
362. 787 P.2d 1025 (Alaska 1990).
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plaintiff's wife joined the tort action, asserting a claim of loss of consortium. In the tort action, the plaintiff and his wife accepted a settlement contingent upon the wife voluntarily dismissing her claim for
loss of consortium. 363 When the plaintiff then claimed workers' compensation benefits for the loss arising from the accident at issue in the
settled tort action, the plaintiff's employer sought to offset the settlement against the employer's workers' compensation obligations pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 23.30.015(g). 364 The Alaska Supreme
Court held that since part of the settlement included resolution of the
wife's claim for loss of consortium, the Board would have to apportion
the damage settlement and offset only that portion that was in settle365
ment of the plaintiff's tort claim.
In Caspersen v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Board,3 66 the
supreme court reversed an administrative decision by the Board and
held that the social security offset provided for in the Alaska Statutes, 367 which became effective in 1977, does not apply to a worker
injured prior to the effective date of the statute. 368 The court based its
decision on its observation in Hood v. Workers' Compensation
Board 369 that workers' compensation acts "'should be liberally construed in favor of the employee ....[S]tatutes are presumed to operate
prospectively and will not be given a retroactive effect, unless by express terms or necessary implication, it clearly appears that that was
the legislative intent.' ",370 The court found no such legislative
intent. 37 1
In Sherrod v. Municipality of Anchorage,372 the supreme court reversed the Board's refusal to adjudicate the claim of the plaintiff's
health insurer, Aetna, for reimbursement of medical bills paid following a work-related injury. The Board erroneously concluded that the
363. Id. at 1025.
364. The statute provides:
If the employee or the employee's representative recovers damages from a
third person, the employee or representative shall promptly pay to the employer the total amounts paid by the employer.., insofar as the recovery is
sufficient after deducting all litigation costs and expenses. Any excess recovery by the employee or the representative shall be credited against any
amount payable by the employer thereafter.
ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.015(g) (1990).
365. Gossett, 787 P.2d at 1026.
366. 786 P.2d 914 (Alaska 1990) (per curiam).
367. ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.225 (1990).
368. Casperen, 786 P.2d at 915.
369. 574 P.2d 811 (Alaska 1978).
370. Caspersen, 786 P.2d at 915 (quoting Hood, 574 P.2d at 813-14).
371. Id; see ALASKA STAT. § 01.10.090 (1990) ("No statute is retrospective unless
expressly declared therein.").
372. 803 P.2d 874 (Alaska 1990).
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plaintiff lacked a legally cognizable interest in the controversy and implicitly denied the plaintiff's petition to require Aetna to be joined as a
party. 373 The supreme court held that under the Alaska Administrative Code3 74 any person who might have relief should be joined as a
party. 375 Because Aetna did not intend to waive its claim for reimbursement, it could be joined regardless of its professed unwillingness
to hire local counsel. 37 6 The court further found that as long as the
plaintiff remained potentially liable to Aetna, the plaintiff was an "inAct 377 and
terested party" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation
378
Board.
the
was therefore entitled to a hearing before
C. Miscellaneous
Four additional cases decided in the area of employment law address a variety of substantive areas. Doe v. Samaritan Counseling
Center379 arose out of the plaintiff's sexual relationship with her counselor, an employee of the defendant. On the issue of respondeat superior, the court held that as long as the "tortious conduct arises out of
and is reasonably incidental to the employee's legitimate work activities," the employer could be held liable even though the employee's
acts are not motivated by a desire to serve the employer. 380 Although
the conduct in question took place in part after the counseling had
terminated and away from the employer's premises, the court found
that the employer could be held liable because the intercourse was suf381
ficiently connected to the tortious misuse of the counseling sessions.
State Commission for Human Rights v. Department of Administration382 involved the interpretation of Alaska Statutes section
18.80.220(a)(5), which prohibits employers from discriminating "in
the payment of wages as between the sexes.., for work of a comparable character... .",383 The Commission for Human Rights interpreted
the statute to require equal pay for jobs of comparable value to the
employer.384 The court disagreed with the Commission and held that
the "comparable character" language of the statute required equal pay
373. Id. at 875.
374. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8,

§ 45.040(c) (Oct. 1988).

375. Sherrod, 803 P.2d at 875.

376. Id. at 875-76.
377. See ALASKA STAT. § 23.30.110 (1990).
378. Sherrod, 803 P.2d at 876.
379. 791 P.2d 344 (Alaska 1990); see Note, Bad SamaritansMake DangerousPrecedent: The Perils of Holding an Employer Liablefor an Employee's Sexual Misconduct, 8 ALASKA L. REv. 181 (1991).
380. Samaritan, 803 P.2d at 348.

381. Id. at 349.

382. 796 P.2d 458 (Alaska 1990).
383. ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(5) (Supp. 1990).
384. State Comm'n for Human Rights, 796 P.2d at 459.
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for substantially equal work. 38 5 The court further interpreted subsection (a)(5) as prohibiting intentional discrimination in the payment of
3 86
wages.
In Public Safety Employees Association v. State,3 7 the Public
Safety Employees Association ("PSEA") filed an unfair labor practices
charge based upon the reclassification of certain state trooper recruits
following a breakdown in contract negotiations. The Alaska Labor
Relations Agency ("Agency") found for the PSEA and granted back
pay and a cease and desist order preventing further reclassification. 388
The superior court reversed, but the Alaska Supreme Court reversed
the superior court, remanding the case for a determination of whether
substantial evidence supported the Agency's conclusions. 38 9
The court found that the Agency's refusal to defer to the grievance procedures outlined in the collective bargaining agreement was
justified under the circumstances. The Agency had noted that the
Commissioner of Public Safety indicated that in his view the dispute
was not arbitrable, therefore deference to those procedures would have
been futile for the PSEA. 390 Alaska Statutes section 23.40.210391 does
not absolutely require the exhaustion of contract grievance procedures
but permits the Agency some discretion in determining the most efficient path toward resolution of charges of unfair labor practices. 392
In a related case, State v. Public Safety Employees Association,393
the state appealed from an arbitrator's award assigning certain state
job classifications to collective bargaining agreement pay ranges, arguing that the arbitrator grossly overreached his authority in concluding
that the assignment of the positions to pay ranges was a mandatory
subject of bargaining. 394 Both the superior court and the supreme
court upheld the arbitrator's award. Since the parties both agreed to
submit the question to the arbitrator, the court awarded great deference to the arbitrator's decision, applying an "arbitrary and capricious
385. Id. at 461-62.
386. Id. at 461.

387. 799 P.2d 315 (Alaska 1990).
388. Id. at 316-17.
389. Id. at 325.
390. Id. at 322-23.

391. The statute provides, in relevant part:
The [collective bargaining] agreement shall include a grievance procedure
which shall have binding arbitration as its final step. Either party to the

agreement has a right of action to enforce the agreement by petition to the
labor relations agency.
§ 23.40.210 (1990).
392. Public Safety Employees Ass'n, 799 P.2d at 323.
393. 798 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1990).

ALASKA STAT.

394. Id. at 1282.
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standard" of review. 395 The court then announced its intention to apply the same standard
to all cases reviewing awards in compulsory
396
interest arbitration.
VII.

FAMILY LAW

The court considered various issues in the family law area in
1990, deciding fourteen cases. These cases are presented here in four
categories: jurisdiction, property division, child support and custody,
and parental rights.
A. Jurisdiction
The court decided two cases regarding Alaska jurisdiction in
child custody disputes. While jurisdiction was granted in one and denied in the other, the court's general willingness to defer jurisdiction to
397
the other state in these cases was evident.
In Baumgartnerv. Baumgartner,39 8 the supreme court dealt with
the court's jurisdiction over a child custody order under the Alaska
399
version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA")
when the child and the custodial parent have left Alaska but the noncustodial parent has remained in the state. The court affirmed its
holding in Szmyd v. Szyd 4°° that jurisdiction to modify custody
must exist at the time of the motion to modify, regardless of the jurisdiction of the original custody decree. 40 1 Here, because the children
had lived outside Alaska for four years, the jurisdictional prerequisites
for custody were not met and the judgment of the superior court was
reversed for lack of jurisdiction. 40 2
In Wanamaker v. Scott,40 3 the original custody decree and a custody modification order were obtained in the state of Washington, but
the child lived with her father in Alaska from 1981 to 1987, going to
Washington only to visit her mother. In 1987 the mother filed for
custody modification in the Alaska Superior Court. The court rejected
the father's argument that the UCCJA required the Alaska court to
defer to Washington's continuing jurisdiction, 4°4 holding that, under
395. Id. at 1287-88.
396. Id.
397. This trend was also noted in Note, Alaska Supreme Court Year in Review
1989, 7 ALASKA L. RaV. 87, 129 (1990).
398. 788 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1990).
399. ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.30.010-910 (1983 & Supp. 1990).
400. 641 P.2d 14 (Alaska 1982).
401. Baumgartner,788 P.2d at 40.
402. Id.; see ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.020 (1983) (enumerating the conditions that
must be met in order for the court to have jurisdiction to modify custody).
403. 788 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1990).
404. Id. at 713. The UCCIA provides:
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the statute, Washington would not claim jurisdiction since Alaska had
the more significant ties to the child at the time of the motion. 4°5
The plaintiff also challenged the superior court's award of attorney's fees as part of the modification order granting child custody to
his former wife. The supreme court reversed the superior court's
award of attorney's fees on the basis of the plaintiff's "bad faith and
vexatious conduct" in opposing the motion for the change of custody,4°6 holding that the plaintiff's conduct did not amount to bad
faith sufficient to warrant sanctions. 40 7
B.

Property Division

In Lewis, v. Lewis,4 08 an appeal and cross-appeal arose from a dispute over the distribution of marital property in a divorce action, particularly the distribution of 600,000 shares of stock in a closely held
corporation. The supreme court reversed the lower court, ruling that
the shares of stock purchased during the marriage with the husband's
pre-marital assets were marital property and subject to distribution. 4° 9
The court found that the shares were held in the names of both parties
and that, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the husband
had intended the property to be marital. 4 10
The court also ruled that the husband's contingent stock in his
employer was a marital asset subject to distribution,41' electing to
treat this asset as if it were a non-vested pension, and ruling that the
wife was entitled to half of that amount that would have accrued dur41 2
ing the time the couple was married.
(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a superior court
of this state may not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of
this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with
this chapter or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree, and
(2) the court of this state has jurisdiction.
ALASKA STAT. § 25.30.130(a) (1983); see also Smyzd v. Smyzd, 641 P.2d 14, 16-17
(Alaska 1982).
405. Wanamaker, 788 P.2d at 714-15 (citing In re Custody of Thorensen, 46 Wash.
App. 493, 506-07, 730 P.2d 1380, 1388 (1987)).
406. Wanamaker, 788 P.2d at 715.
407. Id. at 716 (citing L.L.M. v. P.M., 754 P.2d 262, 265 (Alaska 1988) (attorney's
fees will be assessed only against litigants who have acted willfully and without just
cause)).
408. 785 P.2d 550 (Alaska 1990).
409. Id. at 555.

410. Id.
411. Id. at 556.
412. Id.
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The Alaska Supreme Court upheld the lower court, however,
finding that the husband's employment contract was not a marital asset and therefore not subject to distribution. 413 The supreme court
remanded for further explanation from the lower court on why it had
final amount owed the wife in
subtracted temporary alimony from the
414
the distribution of the marital assets.
In Murray v. Murray,41 5 the parties had cohabitated for five and
one half years before marriage. During this time, they shared a checking account and co-mingled some of their assets. 416 On appeal from
the superior court's division of marital property, the supreme court
noted that property can be deemed marital even if acquired before the
reaching
date of marriage and that nothing prevents a trial court from
41 7
a party's separate pre-marital assets if equity so requires.
The Alaska Supreme Court partially affirmed the superior court's
41 8
unequal division of marital property in Oberhansly v. Oberhansly.
The lower court permissibly based its division in part on the husband's
conduct during the separation, particularly his conduct in allowing
several marital debts to go into arrears. 4 19 The supreme court partially reversed the division, however, because the lower court failed to
consider the tax consequences to the husband of removing funds from
his retirement account. 420 Where the division of property will create
an immediate and specific tax liability, the trial court42 1must consider
that liability in deciding on an equitable distribution.
In Bandow v. Bandow, 422 the husband challenged the superior
court's determination that an annuity, given in settlement of the husband's medical malpractice claim, was marital property subject to division.423 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the
annuity was marital property only insofar as it compensated for loss to
the marital estate by replacing pre-divorce lost earnings. 4 24 To the
extent that it replaced post-divorce lost earnings or compensated for
413. Id. at 558.
414. Id. at 554. The lower court treated the money going toward the wife's interim
support as marital property. Because the relationship of temporary alimony to marital property is not clear in Alaska, the supreme court required the lower court's rationale before reaching a decision on abuse of discretion. Id. at 553.
415. 788 P.2d 41 (Alaska 1990).
416. Id. at 41.
417. Id. at 42.
418. 798 P.2d 883, 888 (Alaska 1990).
419. Id. at 885.
420. Id. at 887.
421. Id. (citing Weinberg v. Weinberg, 67 Cal. 2d 557, 432 P.2d 709, Cal. Rptr. 13
(1967)).
422. 794 P.2d 1346 (Alaska 1990).
423. Id. at 1347.
424. Id. at 1348.
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the husband's pain and suffering, the annuity was not marital property, and therefore not subject to division. 425 The court further held
that the lower court was entitled to use its discretion in apportioning
the annuity among these functions and that the spouse seeking a portion of the annuity as separate property bore the burden of proving
what portion of the annuity compensated for loss of separate
4 26
property.
The supreme court in Gilboe v. Gilboe4 27 held that the wife had
no compensable interest in the goodwill of a hotel that had been sold
three years before the divorce, with the sale proceeds used in joint
living expenses. 428 The court also found that the superior court had
erred in invading the separate property of the husband on the theory
that the wife should be compensated for the difference between the
amount of her earning capacity and the amount of support actually
429
provided during the marriage.
C.

Child Support and Custody

Smith v. Department of Revenue, 430 the only 1990 case strictly
concerning child support, involved a consolidated appeal in which two
appellants, both Alaska inmates, challenged the child support awards
entered against them by the Child Support Enforcement Division.
The supreme court rejected their arguments, holding that they had
received a fair hearing, 4 31 that income derived from work in prison
was not insulated from payment of child support, 432 that the use of the
inmates' earnings did not deny them their constitutional right of access to a rehabilitation program, 4 33 and that the attachment of the
4 34
prisoner's accounts did not violate their right to due process.
In Nichols v. Mandelin,435 a custody dispute, the supreme court
affirmed the principle recognized in S.N.E. v. R.L.B. 436 that a change
of custody from the father to the mother could not be decreed absent a
425. Id. at 1348-49.
426. Id. at 1350.
427. 789 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1990).

428. Id. at 345.
429. Id. at 345-46.
430. 790 P.2d 1352 (Alaska 1990).

431. Id. at 1353.
432. Id. Alaska Statutes section 33.32.050 provides the commissioner of corrections with a method for calculating and disbursing prisoner earnings. Under subsec-

tion (c), support of the prisoner's dependents is given the highest disbursement
priority. ALASKA STAT. § 33.32.050 (1986).
433. Smith, 790 P.2d at 1354.
434. Id.
435. 790 P.2d 1367 (Alaska 1990).
436. 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
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finding of "substantial change in circumstances. ' 437 The noncustodial
parent must show not only a change in circumstances, but also that a
modification would be in the child's best interests. 438 Under the circumstances of this case, the court held that there had been a substantial change in circumstances in light of the noncustodial parent's
remarriage, full-time employment since 1982 and sustained control of
a drinking problem.4 39 The court affirmed the lower court's decision
that the change in custody would be in the child's best interests and
that the father should not be awarded joint custody. Factors leading
to this decision included the father's failure to 1) consult the mother
on important issues concerning the child, 2) encourage visitation by
the mother, and 3) exercise good judgment in the rearing of the child
in general.440
Recognizing that a custodial parent's removal of a child from the
state constitutes a change in circumstances, the court in Lee v. Cox 441
emphasized that the noncustodial parent still must bear the burden of
showing that a modification would be in the child's best interests. 44 2
According to the court, the custodial mother's decision to move to
Washington state was insufficient to warrant a change of custody without any other indications of change. 443 The court also ruled that the
lower court had erred in ordering the mother to reimburse the child
for all permanent funds received on his behalf. The father asserted
that the parents had agreed to set aside the child's permanent fund
of that
dividends as part of the divorce decree, but, absent evidence
444
reimbursement.
order
to
refused
agreement, the court
Hermosillo v. Hermosillo44 5 arose as a result of the defendant
mother's unilateral imposition of conditions on the plaintiff father's
supervised visits with his children. Believing his ex-wife to be in contempt, the plaintiff filed a motion for order to show cause and a motion for a change of venue. The superior court dismissed both
motions. 44 6 The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that
the conditions imposed by the defendant could substantially interfere
437. Nichols, 790 P.2d at 1371.
438. Id. at 1372 n.10 (citing Veazey v. Veazey, 560 P.2d 382, 386 (Alaska 1977),
and Horutz v. Horutz, 560 P.2d 397, 401 (Alaska 1977)).
439. Id. at 1372.
440. Id. at 1373.
441. 790 P.2d 1359 (Alaska 1990).
442. Id. at 1361 (citing House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1208 (Alaska 1989)).
443. Id. at 1363.
444. Id; see also, L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827, 832-33 n.13 (Alaska 1976) (among
the "parental rights" protected by the constitution is the "right to control and manage" a minor child's earnings and property); ALASKA STAT. § 43.23.005(c) (1990)
(parent may claim permanent fund dividend on behalf of minor).
445. 797 P.2d 1206 (Alaska 1990).
446. Id. at 1208.
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with the plaintiff's visitation rights and were thus a change of circumstances that required a modification by the court. 447 The court emthe authority to modify a noncustodial
phasized that only a court has
48
parent's visitation rights.
The child involved in In the Matter ofA.B. 44 9 was in the custody
of the Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Family
and Youth Services ("Department") as a result of her father's neglect. 450 Contrary to the state social worker's recommendation, the
superior court ordered the Department to permit visitation between
the father and his daughter under the supervision of a priest. 451 The
supreme court first held that the proper standard of review of superior
court decisions restricting visitation is a preponderance of the evidence.4 52 The court then found that the lower court's decision was
supported by a preponderance of the evidence because the Department
had failed to show that its proposed restriction on visitation would
serve the child's best interests.4 5 3 The court also ruled that the superior court's order for release of records concerning the case to parties
providing services to the family was within the discretion of the45lower
4
court to order sharing of records among all parties to the suit.
In Bell P. Bell,4 55 the father appealed the trial court's award of
primary custody to the mother and disputed the court's calculation of
child support and property division. 456 Recognizing the legislative
preference for joint custody, 457 the supreme court found that the parties' disagreement over the issue of day care did not demonstrate an
inability to cooperate, and thus joint custody was possible.4 58 The
447. Id. at 1209.
448. Id.
449. 791 P.2d 615 (Alaska 1990).
450. Id. at 616-17.
451. Id. at 617.
452. Id. at 618 n.3.
453. Id. at 618-19.
454. Id. at 620. Alaska Statutes section 47.10.090(a) provides, in relevant part:
All information and social records pertaining to a minor and prepared by an
employee of the court or by a federal, state or city agency in the discharge of
the employee's or agency's official duty ...

are privileged and may not be

disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone without the court's permission.
However, a state or city law-enforcement agency shall disclose information
regarding a case which is needed by the person or agency charged with making a preliminary investigation for the information of the court.
ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.090(a) (1990). Court discretion to order the disclosure of
records in a "child in need of aid" proceeding has previously received judicial acknowledgement. See Clifton v. State, 758 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
455. 794 P.2d 97 (Alaska 1990).
456. Id. at 97.
457. Id. at 99.
458. Id. at 100.
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court remanded the issues of child support and division of property for
a more accurate assessment of the father's monthly income, and required a division of property in line with the three-step analysis set
forth in Wanberg v. Wanberg and Merrill v. Merrill.4 59 This analysis
requires the identification of specific property available for distribution, determination of the value of this property and determination of
the most equitable division of this property, with a presumption that
equal division is most equitable.4 60 The alternative method of property distribution in Alaska employed in Rose v. Rose 4 61 was not used
in this case because the parties commingled assets during the marriage. The Rose analysis is typically used when the marriage is of
short duration, and there has been no significant commingling of
4 62
assets.
D. Parental Rights
In In re D.J.A. a/k/a MR.E.,463 the lower court granted a petition for adoption to L.A., the father's second wife, over the objection
of the child's natural mother. 464 This order was reversed by the
Alaska Supreme Court.4 65 L.A. had successfully argued to the lower
court that the natural mother's consent to the petition was not required because she had failed to communicate with the child for more
than one year. 466 The natural mother responded that she had had justifiable cause for her failure to communicate. In reversing the lower
court's order, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that L.A. had failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that the natural mother lacked
legally sufficient justification for her failure to communicate, and
therefore she had not forfeited her right to consent to the adoption of
467
her child.
459. Id. at 103 (citing Wanberg v. Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568, 570, 574-75 (Alaska
1983); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547-48 n.4 (Alaska 1962)).
460. Id. at 101.
461. 755 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1988). Under this alternative, property division is
treated "as an action in the nature of recession, aimed at placing the parties in ... the
financial position they would have occupied had no marriage taken place." Id. at
1125.
462. Bell, 794 P.2d at 102.
463. 793 P.2d 1033 (Alaska 1990).
464. Id. at 1035.
465. Id. at 1039.
466. Id. at 1035; see ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.050(a) (Supp. 1990) ("Consent to
adoption is not required of... (2) a parent of a child in the custody of another, if the
parent for a period of at least one year has failed significantly without justifiable cause,
including but not limited to indigency, (A) to communicate meaningfully with the

child .... ").
467. D.J.A., 793 P.2d at 1037. Under the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in
D.L.J. v. W.D.R., 635 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1981), the adoptive parent carries the burden
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FISH AND GAME LAW

The Alaska Supreme Court decided six cases involving fish and
game law during 1990. Several of the cases touched on constitutional
law, but are included in this category because aspects of the cases are
unique to fish and game law.
Set-net fishers in Carney v. Board of Fisheries46 8 sought declaratory and injunctive relief from a regulation established by the Alaska
Board of Fisheries limiting the distance from the shore that set-netters
may fish in the Combine Flats and Ekuk areas of the Nushagak district. 469 The purpose of the regulation was to allocate fishing resources between set-net and drift-net fishers because there had been
numerous reports of "gear conflicts" between the two groups in areas
believed to be traditionally drift-net areas. 470 The set-netters challenged the regulation on the ground that it was adopted in violation of
the state's conflict of interest statute. 471
On the conflict of interest issue, the Alaska Supreme Court applied common law principles instead of a statutory analysis, reasoning
that Alaska Statutes section 39.50.090 does not extinguish common
law rights and remedies previously recognized. 472 The court found
that several board members who participated in the adoption of the
regulation were heavily involved in drift-net fishing in the areas covered by the regulation. Three board members held entry permits for a
drift-net fishery in the area; another member was a crewman in the
same fishery. 4 73 The court noted that under the principles of Consumers Union of United States v. California Milk Producers Advisory
Board,474 these board members could have voted on gear conflicts in
general, but should have abstained from decisions affecting areas in
of proving a failure of communication under Alaska Statutes section
25.23.050(a)(2)(A). If the natural parent can show evidence of just cause for that
failure, the adoptive parent must then prove by clear and convincing evidence that the
failure was unjustifiable. D.L.J., 635 P.2d at 837.
468. 785 P.2d 544 (Alaska 1990).
469. Id. at 545; see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 06.331(n) (Jan. 1991) (repealed
1985).
470. Carney, 785 P.2d at 546.
471. ALASKA STAT. § 39.50.090(a) (1987). The set-netters also challenged the regulation on equal protection grounds, under article VIII of the Alaska Constitution,
which govern the state's use of its natural resources. Carney, 785 P.2d at 547; see
ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2, 13-14, 16-17. The court found it unnecessary to
reach those claims as the regulation was invalid under common law. Carney, 785 P.2d
at 549.
472. Id. at 548.
473. Id. at 546-47.
474. 82 Cal. App. 3d 433, 147 Cal. Rptr. 265 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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which they had a specific and narrow interest.4 75 Adopting the Consumers Union rationale, the supreme court held that the regulation
was invalid because the majority of votes cast to pass the regulation
476
were tainted by self-interest.
In Matson v. Commercial Fisheries Entry Commission,4 77 the
supreme court upheld the Commission's regulations governing the
qualification for entry permits for gill-net fishing. Under the regulations, applications for entry permits are judged on a points system,
taking into account such criteria as dependence on income from fishing and past participation in fishing.4 78 The court held that it was
reasonable for the Commission to apply the same standard of hardship
to both set-netters and gill-netters. 4 79 The court also found that the
regulations did not deny set-netters equal protection, even though the
unitary standard had the effect of favoring gill-netters because they
derived a greater percentage of their income from fishing. 4 0 Under
Alaska's sliding scale analysis of state equal protection claims, the
court held that the right to engage in an economic endeavor is an important right, 48 1 and that an application procedure interfering with
that right should be closely scrutinized. 48 2 The Matson court also
found that "[t]he challenged regulation is closely related to the 'legislative purpose of preventing unjust discrimination because it seeks to
protect those having the most to lose by exclusion from the fishery.' ",483 However, the court ruled that, as a matter of procedural due
process, the plaintiff should have been heard on the question of
whether he was ninety percent dependent on income from fishing, and
the court remanded for consideration of this issue. 4 84
Riley v. Simon 48 5 was a class action suit against the Commercial
Fisheries Entry Commission ("CFEC") on behalf of Alaska Natives
who were unable to complete the application and meet the deadlines
for limited entry fishing permits due to geographic location, language
barriers, cultural background, or race. 48 6 The class sought injunctive
475. Carney, 785 P.2d at 548.
476. Id. at 549.
477. 785 P.2d 1200 (Alaska 1990).
478. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 5.600 (Oct. 1988).

479. Matson, 785 P.2d at 1204.
480. Id. at 1204-05.

481. Id. at 1205; see State v. Enserch Alaska Constr., 787 P.2d 624, 632 (Alaska
1989).
482. Matson, 785 P.2d at 1205.

483. Id. (quoting Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d
1255, 1268 (Alaska 1980)).

484. Id. at 1206.
485. 790 P.2d 1339 (Alaska 1990).
486. The number of people entering the commercial fisheries of Alaska may be
regulated. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.010 (1987). The Commercial Fisheries Entry
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relief extending the deadline and requiring the CFEC to provide assistance to applicants. 4 87 The supreme court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the plaintiffs from the class. The court held that because
these individual plaintiffs had decided for personal reasons not to apclass that was defined as
ply for permits, they were not within the488
application.
the
complete
to
people unable
In another class action suit, Carlson v. Commercial FisheriesEntry Commission,489 class members challenged the state's regulation
charging non-resident fishermen three times the fee charged resident
fishermen for commercial licenses and limited entry permits. 490 The
supreme court found that "commercial fishing is a sufficiently important activity to come within the purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, and license fees which discriminate against nonresidents
are prima facie a violation of it." 49 If, however, the fee structure
charged non-residents more because residents were indirectly charged
extra by foregoing participation in some of the state's oil revenues, the
fee structure would be valid. 492 The court remanded to the superior
court for a determination of whether the higher fees were excessive for
this purpose, which requires " 'a fairly precise fit between remedy and
classification.' 493 The court rejected the plaintiff's challenge to the
Commission's authority to promulgate regulations concerning the fee
schedule, reasoning that Alaska Statutes section 16.43.110(a) is a
broad delegation of power by the legislature to the Commission to
regulations to implement the purposes
adopt "necessary and proper"
494
of the Limited Entry Act.
In Gilbert v. Department of Fish and Game,495 the fishermen
plaintiffs challenged an amended Board of Fisheries' ("Board") regulation that limited the total harvest of Chignik-bound sockeye salmon
in the Stepovak fishery. 496 The supreme court agreed with the plaintiffs that the Board's "mixed stock" fishing policy was a regulation and
Commission may establish a deadline for applying for entry to the fisheries. Id.
§ 16.43.260.
487. Riley, 790 P.2d at 1340.
488. Id. at 1343.

489. 798 P.2d 1269 (Alaska 1990).
490. ALASKA STAT. § 16.43.160(b) (1987).

491. Carlson, 798 P.2d at 1274 (citations omitted); see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
492. Id. at 1278. The court equated oil revenues spent on conservation with "taxes
which only residents pay." Id.
493. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Conta, 106 Wis. 2d 321, 316 N.W.2d 814, 823 n.17

(1982)).
494. Id. at 1278-79; see Act of Aug. 30, 1973, ch. 79, 1973 Alaska Sess. Laws 1
(codified as amended at ALASKA STAT. §§ 16.43.010-990 (1987 & Supp. 1990)).
495. 803 P.2d 391 (Alaska 1990).
496. Id. at 392.
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not been adopted pursuant to the Adthus was invalid because it had
ministrative Procedures Act.4 97 However, the court ruled that
striking down the "policy" did not automatically invalidate regulations
adopted pursuant to the policy. 498 The supreme court reiterated that
"'regulation,' under [Alaska Statutes section] 44.62.640(a)(3), 'encompasses many statements made by administrative agencies, including policies and guides to enforcement.' ,,499 Because the Board failed
to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedures
Act in adopting the policy, the policy was invalid.5° The court then
recognized that a regulation enacted pursuant to this policy might still
be valid as long as the regulation was "'reasonable and not arbitrary,
based on the total information before the Board at the time [it] was
adopted.'"501 Under this standard, the court found the regulation
reasonable in the context of the Board's responsibility for conservation
and development of fish resources502
The court also rejected the plaintiffs' procedural challenge involving inadequate notice 0 3 and their constitutional objection involving
the uniform application clause of article VIII, section 17 of the Alaska
Constitution.5°4 According to the court, the Board's pre-hearing no50 5
tice was sufficiently informative to comply with the notice statute;
before the meeting in which the Board established the limit, the Board
published notice of the meeting in several state newspapers and made
available to the public a packet containing the proposal.50 6 In addressing the fishermen's constitutional claim, the court ruled that the uniform application clause of article VIII, section 17 was inapplicable
not "similarly situated"
because the Stepovak and Igvak fisheries5 were
07
as to their biological spawning patterns.
In State v. Hebert,50 8 herring sac roe fishermen challenged their
conviction under Alaska Administrative Code title 5, section
497. Id. at 395-97.
498. Id. at 397.
499. Id. (quoting Kenai Peninsula Fisherman's Co-op v. State, 628 P.2d 897, 905

(Alaska 1981)).
500. Id.
501. Id. (quoting Kenai Peninsula, 628 P.2d at 907).
502. Id.
503. Id. at 394; see ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.200(a) (1989).
504. Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 398; see ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 17 ("Laws and regulations governing the use or disposal of natural resources shall apply equally to all
persons similarly situated with reference to the subject matter and purpose to be
served by the law or regulation.")
505. Gilbert, 803 P.2d at 395.

506. Id. at 393.
507. Id. at 399.
508. 803 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1990).
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27.987,509 which established two "superexclusive" use fisheries in the
central Bering Sea and prohibits any fisherman who operates in one of
the superexclusive fisheries from participating in any other herring sac
roe fishery.5 10 The supreme court affirmed the Board's authority to
promulgate the superexclusive use regulations, and held that neither
the federal constitution 1 I nor the state constitution5 1 2 had been violated.5 1 3 The court adopted the reasoning of the court of appeals concerning the federal constitutional issues and the state equal rights
5 14
issue, but it examined the state constitutional claims in more depth.
In determining petitioners' state equal rights claims, the court
distinguished State v. EnserchAlaska Construction, Inc.,515 which held
unconstitutional a statute that provided a public works hiring preference for residents of economically distressed locales.5 1 6 The court
ruled in this case that the goal behind the superexclusive fisheries regulations is to benefit local residents but that, in contrast to Enserch,
5 17
there was no discrimination between residents and non-residents.
The superexclusive use regulations have the same effect on everyone,
between fishing either inforcing members of either group to choose
51 8
zones.
designated
the
outside
or
side
The supreme court also rejected the petitioners' contention that
the superexclusive use districts are too small for effective participation
by large operators and thus discriminate based on the scale of the operation.5 1 9 The court noted that "'time and area restrictions,' like
been recognized as permissible to
gear size limitations," have long
5 20
achieve optimum catch levels.
Regarding petitioners' article VIII challenges, the supreme court
acknowledged that the regulation was partly an allocation decision
509. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 27.987 (July 1988).
510. Hebert, 803 P.2d at 867.
511. Id. at 864. Specifically, the petitioners' federal constitutional claims concerned the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2; the commerce
clause of article I, section 8; and the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment.
512. Id. Specifically, the petitioners' state constitutional claims concerned the
equal rights clause of article I, section 1; the common use clause of article VIII, section 3; the prohibition against exclusive fishing rights of article VIII, section 15; and
the equal application clause of article VIII, section 17.
513. Id.at 865.
514. Id.
515. 787 P.2d 624 (Alaska 1989). The court based its decision on state equal rights
grounds, holding that the disparate treatment of workers in different areas in order to
benefit one group was not a legitimate legislative goal. Id. at 634.
516. Id.
517. Hebert, 803 P.2d at 865.
518. Id.
519. Id. at 866.
520. Id. at 865-66 (quoting Glenovich v. Noerenberg, 346 F. Supp. 1286, 1288 (D.
Alaska 1972), aff'd 409 U.S. 1070 (1972)).
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which divided the herring resource between competing subgroups of
commercial fishermen.5 2 1 However, the court found that these regulations did not violate article VIII's prohibition against exclusive or special privileges to take fish or wildlife,5 22 as interpreted in McDowell v.
State.523 The "exclusive registration" simply restricted fishing in more
than one district in any one year, and, as such, resembled restrictions
on salmon fishing that were common when the framers of the constitution met in 1956. Because "there [was] no suggestion in the debates of
the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that this regulating device was meant to be prohibited by the article VIII equal access
clauses," the court determined that the constitution did not prohibit
this method of regulation. 524
IX.

PROCEDURE

As in 1989, the Alaska Supreme Court faced a variety of procedural challenges during 1990. Many of these cases involved substantive questions in other areas, but because the procedural issues
predominate, these cases are presented in this section under four broad
categories: discovery, preclusion, summary judgment, and attorney's
fees and costs. Cases falling outside the scope of these categories are
discussed under the "miscellaneous" heading at the end of this section.
A.

Discovery

In Jones v. Jennings,5 25 the plaintiff brought charges of assault,
false imprisonment and civil rights violations against the Municipality
of Anchorage and two of its police officers. The plaintiff sought discovery of one of the officer's personnel records and other documents
relating to internal investigations of citizen complaints against the municipality's police officers. 526 The supreme court determined that the
documents were not privileged under the Anchorage Municipal
Code,527 and thus "the trial court properly ordered the documents discoverable subject to prior in camera inspection for the purpose of
'5 28
screening particularly sensitive files."
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.

Id. at 866.
Id.
787 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1989).
Hebert, 803 P.2d at 866-67.
788 P.2d 732 (Alaska 1990).

526. Id. at 733.
527. ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUNICIPAL CODE § 03.90.040 (1985).
528. Jones, 788 P.2d at 737. The supreme court noted with approval that the trial
court had excluded from discovery information related to the officer's family, address
and personal finances. Id.
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The court also held that the discovery order did not violate the
Alaska Constitution's guarantee of a right to privacy. 529 The court
adopted a three-prong test that balanced a legitimate expectation that
the information would not be disclosed against a compelling state interest in favor of such disclosure. If disclosure were deemed necessary, then the court would inquire into whether the disclosure had
been done in the least intrusive manner. 530 In this case, the court
found that the police officer's expectation of confidentiality was outweighed by -the public's interest in having free access to the workings
of government and in ensuring the effective operation of the judiciary.5 31 Because the trial court had conducted an in camera inspection
of the documents, the discovery proceedings satisfied the least intrusive manner requirement and thus did not violate the police officer's
5 32
constitutional right.to privacy.
In Central Construction Co. v. Home Indemnity Co.,5 33 the
supreme court established that the fraud exception to the attorneyclient privilege should be broadly interpreted. 534 This case concerned
the discovery of several documents from the insurer in connection
with the handling of an insurance claim. 535 The superior court denied
the insured's motion to compel discovery in relation to its cross-claim,
holding that the insured must make a prima facie showing of civil
fraud before it could overcome the insurer's claim of privilege.5 36 The
supreme court reversed, holding that "services sought by a client from
an attorney in aid of any crime or a badfaith breach of duty -are not
protected by the attorney-client privilege. '5 37 The court then adopted
a new standard of proof that strikes a balance between allowing in
camera review based on a party's unsupported assertions of fraud, and
holding a paty to the high standard of proof necessary to overcome
the attorney-client privilege. 538 Applying the standard developed by
the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Zolin,5 39 the
Alaska Supreme Court concluded that the insured had presented an
adequate factual basis on which a reasonable person might believe in
good faith that an in camera review of the disputed materials may
529.
privacy
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.
538.
539.

Id. at 739. The Alaska Constitution provides that "[t]he right of the people to
is recognized and shall not be infringed." ALASKA CONsT. art. I, § 22.
Jones, 788 P.2d at 738.
Id. at 739.
Id.
794 P.2d 595 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 598.
Id. at 596-97.
Id. at 597.
Id. at .598.
Id. at 598-99.
491 U.S. 554 (1989).
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reveal evidence to establish that the crime-fraud exception to attorneyclient privilege applies. 54
B. Preclusion

541

Holmberg v. State Division of Risk Management5 42 established
that the determinations by one state agency can have preclusive effect
on proceedings before another state agency.5 43 Holmberg filed a claim
for permanent disability benefits with the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board ("AWCB"). The AWCB denied her claim for permanent
544
disability benefits, and Holmberg appealed to the superior court.
While this appeal was pending, a separate state agency, the Public Employees' Retirement Board ("PERB"), found that Holmberg was permanently and totally disabled and thus awarded her occupational
disability benefits. After the superior court affirmed the AWCB decision, Holmberg appealed to the supreme court, contending that the
PERB decision
should be given binding effect in the AWCB
54 5
proceedings.
The court determined that there was, in general, "no substantial
reason not to give PERB determinations preclusive effect in AWCB
proceedings. ' 546 However, the court held that the PERB decision
should not be given such preclusive effect in this case for two reasons.
First, the state was not in privity with any real party in interest in the
PERB proceedings and thus the plea of collateral estoppel could not
be asserted against the state. 547 Second, the AWCB decision remained
the first final judgment because it did not lose any of its preclusive
effect while being appealed. Original decisions lose their preclusive
effect only if they are reversed on appeal, which, according to the
court, suggests that a stay in a second proceeding pending an appeal in
the first may be appropriate.5 4a To rule otherwise would encourage
relitigation of an issue, and thus be "completely at odds with the purpose of collateral estoppel to prevent relitigation of issues that already
549
have been decided."
540. Central Constr., 794 P.2d at 600.
541. This heading encompasses not only issues of res judicata and collateral
estoppel, but also claims that are untimely for failing to conform to statutes of
limitation and other deadlines.
542. 796 P.2d 823 (Alaska 1990).
543. Id. at 825.
544. Id. at 824.
545. Id.
546. Id. at 827.
547. Id. at 829.

548. IM.
549. Id. In fact, if all the requirements of collateral estoppel were satisfied, Holmberg's claim against the PERD could have been precluded by the prior AWCB decision. Id. at 830.
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In Nelson v. Jones,550 the supreme court acknowledged that divorce proceedings present a narrow exception to the court's traditional
interpretation of res judicata, ruling that the compulsory counterclaim
principles articulated in Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) did not
require interspousal tort claims to be litigated in divorce proceedings. 55 1 However, the court held that the husband was collaterally
estopped from litigating the issue of sexual abuse,5 52 which had been
previously litigated during the divorce proceedings and "explicitly de'5 53
termined... adversely to [him]."
In Palmer v. Borg-WarnerCorporation,5 54 the court took a restrictive view of when the statute of limitations in wrongful death actions
begins to run. The question in this case was when the two-year statute
of limitations for wrongful death actions5 55 began to run: on September 8, 1986, when the plaintiff's husband was killed in an airplane
crash; on September 11 of that same year when the plaintiff was informed of the death; or in July, 1987, when the National Transportation Safety Board finished investigation of the crash, creating a legal
right of access to the wreckage for the first time. Palmer's estate filed
its claims against Borg-Warner Corporation on September 20, 1988.
The court held that the statute expired two years after the estate
had been notified of Palmer's death (September 11) because, upon notification of the crash, "a reasonable person has, as a matter of law,
enough information to be alerted that she 'should begin an inquiry'
concerning a potential cause of action against the pilot, the carmer or
the manufacturer. ' 556 The court reasoned, against strong objections
by Justices Compton and Rabinowitzl 5 7 that the proper focus was
when a potential claimant has sufficient information reasonably to
know that a possible claim existed, not when such a claimant has
knowledge of the precise cause of an injury.5 58
550. 787 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1990).
551. Id. at 1034.

552. Id. at 1036. The ex-wife alleged during the divorce proceedings that the plaintiff had sexually abused their daughter. Id. at 1032.
553. Id. at 1036.

554. 800 P.2d 920 (Alaska 1990), rehgpending No. S-3318 (1990).
555. See ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.580(a) (1990).
556. Palmer, 800 P.2d at 922.

557. Id. at 925 (Compton, J. and Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed
that mere knowledge of an accident does not give notice of possible negligent conduct,
but, rather, such knowledge depends on whether the specific facts and circumstances
permit one to obtain the relevant information surrounding the accident so that one
may accurately assess the actual causes of the accident. Id. at 926 (citing First Interstate Bank of Fort Collins, N.A. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 744 P.2d 1197, 1201 (Colo.

1987)).
558. Id. at 922 & n.3.
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Beavers v. Alaska Construction, Inc.559 affirmed the superior
court's refusal to accept a late appeal from a decision of the Alaska
Workers' Compensation Board.5 60 Although the plaintiff argued that
his attorney had misled him into believing that a timely appeal had
been filed, the court, in keeping with well-established precedent, rejected the plaintiff's plea that he not be held accountable for his attor56 1
ney's conduct.
In Magestro v. State,562 the supreme court held that a riverboat
operator, injured in a collision with a submerged railcar, was not timebarred from amending his complaint under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). 563 The original complaint alleged vicarious liability; the
amendment alleged negligence on the part of the state and added an
allegation based on state ownership of the riverbed. 564 In allowing the
amendment, the supreme court determined that failure to give the
state timely notice of an alternative legal theory would not defeat a
motion under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) when "the original
complaint gave the State notice of the facts of the underlying occur565
rence prior to the running of the two year statute of limitations."
In Smith by Smith v. Marchant Enterprises,Inc.,566 the court addressed the issue of whether the lower court correctly applied the doctrine of quasi-estoppe 567 to the plaintiff's appeal from the dismissal of
5 68
one of her claims by the Workers' Compensation Board.
"[A]ppellant [was] estopped to continue prosecuting the appeal because she accepted the benefits of the Compensation Board decision of
which she seeks review. '5 69 Relying on Hoss v. Purinton,570 the
supreme court held that the theory of quasi-estoppel did not apply to
559. 787 P.2d 643 (Alaska 1990).
560. Id. at 643. The notice of appeal was filed thirty-six days beyond the last day
permissible for appeal under Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 602(a)(2). Id.
561. Id. at 645 (citing Hartland v. Hartland, 777 P.2d 636 (Alaska 1989); Rill v.
State, 669 P.2d 573 (Alaska 1983); Mely v. Morris, 409 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1966)).
562. 785 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1990).
563. Id. at 1213.
564. Id. at 1212.
565. Id. at 1214.
566. 791 P.2d 354 (Alaska 1990).
567. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel is applied in situations where "the existence of
facts and circumstances make[s] the assertion of an inconsistent position unconscionable." Jamison v. Consol. Utilities, Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978).
568. Smith, 791 P.2d at 356. Smith filed a claim against four defendants: Glacier,
MEI, Stockton and Marchant. She reached a Board-approved settlement with Stockton, and at the hearing, the Board found that Glacier and Marchant were liable for
compensation and benefits. Smith also settled with Marchant. MEI was found not
liable, which decision Smith appealed to the superior court. Id. at 355.
569. Id. at 356.
570. 229 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 997 (1956).
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Smith's claim and allowed her claim to go forward.5 7 1 The court reasoned that Smith did not offer inconsistent evidence or pleadings, and
that the overlapping of her equitable remedies against MEI with her
statutory ones under the Workers' Compensation Act did not make
572
her claims inconsistent.
In Integrated Resources Equity Corporation v. Fairbanks North
StarBorough,573 the court reaffirmed its holding in Alaska State Housing Authority v. Riley Pleas, Inc.574 that a party may not raise on appeal possible prejudicial misconduct by an arbitrator unless counsel
objects to such conduct during the arbitration proceedings.5 75 As in
Riley Pleas, the court rejected the argument that an objection should
not be required when counsel feels that such an objection would serve
only to further alienate the arbitrator.5 7 6 The court also held that
under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 82(a)(1), in a proceeding under
Alaska Statutes section 09.43.110 to confirm an arbitration award, a
trial judge may award only the attorney's fees associated with the con5 77
firmation trial, not those incurred during arbitration.
C.

Summary Judgment

In Murat v. F/V Shelikof Strait,578 the owners and operators of
fishing vessels brought an action against a corporation to recover for
bounced checks written to purchase king crabs in 1981. In 1984, the
trial court entered a default judgment against the corporation based on
its willful failure to comply with the court's discovery order.5 7 9 In
1986, the trial court pierced the corporate veil and entered summary
judgment against the officers of the corporation, Joseph Murat and
Chester Hummel, holding them personally responsible for the judgment against the corporation. 580 Murat appealed both decisions.
Although the supreme court affirmed the default judgment on the
grounds that the corporation was provided with reasonable notice of
the impending judgment as well as an opportunity to respond to it,581
it reversed the grant of summary judgment on two grounds. First, the
571. Smith, 791 P.2d at 358.
572. Id.
573. 799 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1990).
574. 586 P.2d 1244 (Alaska 1978).
575. Integrated Resources, 799 P.2d at 298; Riley Pleas, 586 P.2d at 1248.
576. Integrated Resources, 799 P.2d at 298.
577. Id. at 300.
578. 793 P.2d 69 (Alaska 1990).
579. Id. at 71.
580. Id. at 72.
581. Id. at 73. The fact that the corporate officers were served, rather than the
attorney of record, did not render the notice inadequate; minor noncompliance with
Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b) would not be sufficient to vacate a judgment. Id.
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trial court erred in rejecting the defendant's evidentiary objection,
which was based on the requirement of Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) that summary judgments be supported only by admissible
evidence. 582 The supreme court explained that an opposing party need
only object to proffered evidence on the ground that the evidence in
question is not authenticated; the party does not carry the burden of
raising doubt as to whether the documentary evidence is in fact authentic.5 8 3 Secondly, the court reversed on the ground that summary
judgment was unwarranted where there were genuine issues of mateveil and hold the
rial fact concerning whether to pierce the corporate
5 84
defendant personally liable for corporate debts.
D.

Attorney's Fees and Costs

Frazierv. H. C. Price/CIRIConstruction JV585 created an exception to the rule established in Commercial Union Companies v.
Smallwood,586 which required the party introducing a written report
in evidence before the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board to bear
587
the cost of providing the opportunity for cross examination.
Although the Board's regulations currently reflect Smallwood's holding,5 88 the regulations also contain a hearsay exception based on the
Alaska Rules of Evidence:58 9 "a statement is not hearsay if [it] is offered against a party and is... a statement by a person authorized by
him to make a statement concerning the subject.159 0 Based on this
standard, the supreme court determined that the right to cross examine a report's author did not apply as the cross-examining party
had essentially vouched for the credibility and competence of the author by requesting him to write the report.59 ' The court found that as
the cross-examining party had vouched for the author and no urgent
was not required to pay the
need to impeach existed, the employee
592
costs of the cross-examination.
Childs v. Tulin5 93 involved a challenge to the superior court's
award of attorney's fees to employers who were named as individual
Id. at 74-75.
Id. at 75.
Id. at 78-79.
794 P.2d 103 (Alaska 1990).
550 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1976).
Frazier, 794 P.2d at 104.
See ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 45.120 (Oct. 1988).
Frazier, 794 P.2d at 105; see ALASKA R. EvID. 801.
Id. at 105 (citing ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(c)).
Id.
Id. at 106.
593. 799 P.2d 1338 (Alaska 1990).
582.
583.
584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.
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appellees in an appeal from an adverse decision of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Board. The supreme court affirmed, holding that
such an award is within the court's discretion if the claimant's position
is "frivolous, unreasonable, or taken in bad faith. '5 94 The court found
that the claimant actually had a non-frivolous claim, but he had failed
to raise the claim in his opening brief and thereby abandoned the
claim.5 95 Because the claimant failed to argue the non-frivolous claim
or dismiss the appellees from the appeal, it was reasonable for the su5 96
perior court to award the attorney's fees.
The supreme court in Alaska FederalSavings and Loan Associa5 97 addressed for
tion of Juneau v. Bernhardt,
the first time the question
of whether prevailing pro se litigants may recover attorney's fees, and
reversed the lower court's decision awarding such fees. The court
cited several policy reasons for its decision: the difficulty in valuing
non-attorney's time spent on legal tasks, the danger of encouraging
frivolous filings, the express language of Civil Rule 82 specifying "attorney's fees," and the argument that where the litigant incurs no actual fees the award amounts to a penalty to the losing party.5 98
The pro se defendant also sought Civil Rule 11 sanctions alleging
bad faith in the filing of the complaint because the plaintiff allegedly
knew at the time of fling that the pro se defendant was not the owner
of the cable system and therefore not the proper party. 599 Because
several reasonable inferences concerning ownership could have been
drawn from the initial discovery information, the court found that the
trial court had not abused its discretion in denying Rule 11
sanctions.6oo
In Anchorage Daily News v. Anchorage School District,6° 1 the
supreme court held that "a public interest litigant is entitled to the full
amount of its attorney's fees . .. despite whatever minimal private
interest the litigation may have had in the outcome of its suit."' 6° 2 The
court determined that the Daily News had "vindicated an important
public right" when it sued to "compel the school district to disclose
information required by law to be available to the public. ' ' 6°3 While
594.
595.
1980)).
596.
597.
1990).
598.
599.
600.
601.
602.
603.

Id. at 1338.
Id. at 1340 (citing State v. O'Neill Investigations, 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska
Id. at 1341.
788 P.2d 31 (Alaska 1990), published as corrected, 794 P.2d 579 (Alaska
Bernhardt, 794 P.2d at 581.
Id. at 582.
Id. at 582-83.
803 P.2d 402 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
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the court rejected the suggestion that any newspaper engaged in litigation to obtain information for public dissemination was a public litigant, it found that the Daily News had met the public interest criteria
set forth in Murphy v. City of Wrangell,6°4 and that, as such, it was
despite
entitled to the full amount of its reasonable attorney's60fees
5
other benefits it might have received from the litigation.
In T&G Aviation, Inc. v. Footh,606 the supreme court held that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees on a
request filed seventy days after the entry of judgment. The court held
that the request was filed within a reasonable time, and felt it was
significant that the appellees could not show "substantial prejudice as
6 7
a result of the delay."
In Van Dort v. Culliton,608 the trial court awarded the plaintiffs
seventy-five percent of their attorney's fees following their acceptance
of the defendants' offer of judgment under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 68.609 The trial court awarded this amount pursuant to a determination that the defendants had been "vexatious" in their handling
of the litigation. 610 The supreme court found that it was within the
discretion of the lower court to award fees in excess of the presumptive
fees established in Civil Rule 82(a)(1), 6 11 but reversed and remanded
the award, agreeing with the defendants that the lower court's consideration of past settlement negotiations in its6 12finding of vexatiousness
conflicted with prior supreme court rulings.
In Farrv. Stepp,6 13 Tom Farr sued Stephan/Northern ("S/N")
for over $250,000 of unpaid wages, rental equipment, interest, costs
and attorney's fees. 61 4 In its original answer, S/N filed no counterclaim, but later added one seeking $70,000 for unpaid equipment
rental charges and damages for fraud. While the motion to amend
was pending, S/N made an offer of judgment of $60,000, making no
and the court later acreference to the counterclaim. Farr refused,
615
cepted S/N's counterclaim amendment.
604. 763 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1988).
605. Anchorage Daily News, 803 P.2d at 404.
606. 792 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1990).

607. Id. at 672.
608. 797 P.2d 642 (Alaska 1990).

609. Id. at 643.
610. Id.
611. Id.at 645.
612. Id.(citing Day v. Moore, 771 P.2d 436 (Alaska 1989); Myers v. Snow White
Cleaners & Linen Supply, 770 P.2d 750 (Alaska 1989)).
613. 788 P.2d 35 (Alaska 1990).

614. Id. at 36.
615. Id.
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At trial, Farr was awarded $70,000, which was offset by a
$30,000 award to S/N on its counterclaim. 6 16 The trial court then
imposed penal costs and sanctions on Farr pursuant to Alaska Rule of
Civil Procedure 68(b)(1) 617 since Farr had rejected a settlement offer
and received a net gain of less at trial. 6 18 Farr appealed.
The supreme court reversed the imposition of costs and sanctions,
asserting that the trial court erred in assuming that S/N's offer of
judgment had included the counterclaim since the offer made no reference to the counterclaim. 61 9 The court indicated that the superior
court was essentially penalizing Farr for rejecting what S/N had never
offered.6 20 Since Farr's unreduced award exceeded the amount offered
6 21
in settlement, the penal sanctions were reversed.
E. Miscellaneous
In Farmerv. State,622 the supreme court held that a claim was not
time-barred even though the plaintiff failed to discover the name of the
defendant within the applicable statute of limitations. This case expanded the scope of constructive notice under Alaska Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c) and strictly construed the definition of an indispensable party under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 19(c). The dispute
arose when two state troopers confiscated and tagged forty-three
house logs in response to allegations that Farmer had harvested logs
belonging to the Dineega Corporation. Just before two years passed,
Farmer brought suit against the two officers charging violations of his
state and federal constitutional rights. 623 The first officer was named
in the complaint, but the second was listed as "John Doe," as Farmer
did not know his true identity. Six months after filing, Farmer
amended the complaint to name the previously unknown officer. 624
616. Id.
617. The rule provides:
(b) If the judgment finally rendered by the court is not more favorable to
the offeree than the offer, the prejudgment interest accrued up to the date
judgment is entered shall be adjusted as follows:
(1) if the offeree is the party making the claim, the interest rate will be
reduced . . . and the offeree must pay the costs and attorney's fees incurred after the making of the offer ....
ALASKA R. Civ. P. 68(b).
618. Farr,788 P.2d at 37.
619. Id.
620. Id.
621. Id. at 38.
622. 788 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1990).
623. Id. at 44.
624. Id. at 44-45.
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Holding that a two year statute of limitations 625 period was applicable to only the 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claims, 626 the court declared
the state constitutional claims timely because the second defendant
was served within the three-year statute of limitations period applicable to actions against peace officers. 627 The court also held the federal
claims timely, reasoning that the second defendant had constructive
628
notice within the relevant two-year statute of limitations period.
The court concluded that the notice requirements of Civil Rule 15 are
satisfied when the following conditions are met: the new and old parties share the same attorney and therefore imputed notice can be
found; the plaintiff, through no fault of his own, was unaware of the
true identity of the defendant when the pleading was filed; and the
defendant is not prejudiced by the action. 629630Since each of these conditions was met, the action was not barred.
Finally, the court declared that the Dineega Corporation was not
an indispensable party and thus the trial court had abused its discretion in ordering joinder under Civil Rule 19(a). 631 The court explained that the state did not have the right to assert that a third
party's interests were threatened when the third party has expressly
632
disavowed any desire to litigate those interests.
In Princiottav. Municipality of Anchorage,6 33 the Alaska Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's dismissal of appellant's Civil Rule
60(b)(5) motion to set aside two confessions of judgment without action. Due to a clerical error, the appellant had not had sufficient notice of the execution of the judgments and thus the supreme court held
634
his motion to set them aside was still timely.
In Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co., 63 5 the supreme court
affirmed the lower court's refusal to set aside a default judgment
625. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1990).
626. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
627. Farmer, 788 P.2d at 46; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.060(a) (1990).
628. Farmer, 788 P.2d at 50.
629. Id. at 49-50.
630. Id.
631. Id. at 51-52 (citing ALASKA R. Civ. P. 19(a)). The state had moved to join
Dineega as a "person needed for just adjudication" under Civil Rule 19(a). Farmer,
788 P.2d at 51.
632. Id. at 50. The court noted that it was not necessary to join Dineega as a party
in order to determine the central issue of whether Farmer had a property interest in
the logs. Instead, the state could simply subpoena Dineega as a witness. Id.
633. 785 P.2d 559 (Alaska 1990).
634. Id. at 561.
635. 790 P.2d 1374 (Alaska 1990) ("Rapoport I"); see also Rapoport v. Tesoro
Alaska Petroleum Co., 794 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1990) ("Rapoport II") (holding that
decision in Rapoport I collaterally estopped defendant from asserting the same excuse

in subsequent litigation).
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against the defendant for satisfaction of a corporate debt. Defendant
argued that he had not appeared to defend against the original suit
because a car accident had left him incapable of dealing with complicated business matters. 636 The court reiterated its position that a denial to vacate a default judgment will be reversed only if the supreme
court is "'left with the definite and firm conviction on the whole record that the trial judge has made a mistake.' "637 The supreme court
found that the lower court had not erred in finding that the defendof trial
ant's conduct between his receipt of service and the date
638
strongly indicated his competence to defend the motion.
The issue facing the supreme court in Rapoport v. Tesoro Alaska
Petroleum Co. ("Rapoport II") 639 was whether the decision in Rapoport I collaterally estopped the plaintiff from asserting the same excuse
which was rejected in Rapoport L The supreme court held that the
three requirements for application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applied: the parties were identical; the issue to be precluded was identical; and a final judgment on the merits was issued.64°
In Trobough v. French,64 1 the supreme court reversed the trial
court's grant of a new trial and attorney's fees to the plaintiff in a
personal injury suit. The lower court cited four incidents preceding
and during trial that had a "combined prejudicial effect"' 642 on the
plaintiff, although the plaintiff had never objected to them at the
time.6 43 The supreme court reversed, ruling that the plaintiff had
waived any objection to these incidents and644that none of the incidents
resulted in "unfair prejudice or injustice."
X.

PROPERTY

Twelve property cases were decided by the Alaska Supreme
Court in 1990. These cases have been subdivided into three subcategories: eminent domain, landlord-tenant transactions and miscellaneous
issues, including preference rights and adverse possession.
636. Rapoport I, 790 P.2d at 1375.
637. Id. at 1377 (quoting Corso v. Comm'r of Education, 563 P.2d 246, 248
(Alaska 1977) (footnote omitted)).
638. Id.
639. 794 P.2d 949 (Alaska 1990).
640. Id. at 951.
641. 803 P.2d 384 (Alaska 1990) (per curiam).
642. Id. at 384 (quoting trial court).

643. Id. at 385.
644. Id. at 386.
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Eminent Domain

In State v. Lewis,645 the state appealed a jury verdict granting
over half a million dollars in damages to a landowner in an inverse
condemnation case. The land was bisected when the state condemned
a portion of it to build a highway. 46 In calculating compensation for
the landowner, the jury drew two inconsistent conclusions: that the
remaining portion of land was worth more after the condemnation
than the entire parcel had been before it and that the remaining portion of land received no special benefit from the highway project. The
inconsistencies rendered the verdict faulty because any special benefit
to the remaining property would be offset against any compensation
owed to the property owner. 6" 7 The court determined that the original
condemnation action did not create the basis for an objectively reasonable reliance on the state's building of a frontage road, and therefore
the landowner was not entitled to compensation for the state's failure
to build the road." 8 The court held, however, that the landowner was
entitled to compensation for the value of the land actually taken and
compensation for the diminution in value of his land caused by the
state's highway project, offset by any special benefits conferred by the
construction project. 649
Vezey v. State 650 arose out of a dispute over land condemned pursuant to the realignment of the Nome-Council Road. Vezey, the
owner of the condemned land, disputed the state's appraisal of the
land's value, arguing that the state had failed to consider the value of
the property's subsurface mineral resources, particularly gold and
gravel.651 The supreme court held that the lower court appropriately
denied plaintiff's request under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 72(k)
for an interim award of drilling expenses to determine whether or not
the land in question contained gold. 652 The court held, with the support of previous holdings, that under Rule 72(k) the condemnee risks
these expenses when challenging the state's estimation of just compensation and can recover these expenses only if the resulting award is ten
653
percent higher than the original estimate.
The court also held that the lower court properly ruled that the
value of the plaintiff's "land could not be established by evidence of
645. 785 P.2d 24 (Alaska 1990).
646. Id. at 25.
647. Id. at 27; see ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.310(a)(3) (1983).

648. Lewis, 785 P.2d at 28.

649. Id.
650. 798 P.2d 327 (Alaska 1990).
651. Id. at 328.
652. Id. at 331.
653. Id. (citing City of Anchorage v. Scavenius, 539 P.2d 1169, 1175-76 (Alaska
1975) and State v. Salzwedel, 596 P.2d 17, 20 (Alaska 1979)).

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:71

the value to the [s]tate of the gravel taken for.., use in realigning the
Nome-Council road." 6 54 However, the supreme court found that the
lower court improperly excluded evidence of gravel demand for other
such evidence might have helped
independent state projects because
6 55
determine just compensation.
The court also reversed the denial of plaintiff's motion to compel
discovery on the issue of the state's gravel needs. 65 6 The court concluded, however, that the lower court correctly denied the state's
65 7
claimed offset resulting from vacating a pre-existing right-of-way.
"'[T]he rule in Alaska is that special benefits to the remainder can
only be used to offset severance damages to the remainder. In the
event that special benefits exceed severance damages, the landowner is
still entitled to receive the full market value of the portion actually

taken.'

"658

Finally, on the issue of costs and fees, the court held that the
state's request for an offset against Vezey's claimed costs and attorneys' fees was not authorized under Civil Rule 72(c), and that Vezey's
award of costs and attorneys' fees was to be reconsidered on remand to
659
the superior court.
In Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage School District,6 6° the
Municipality of Anchorage designated the plaintiff's land as the future
site of an elementary school. A year after the designation, the plaintiff
sued to force the school board to consummate the purchase or to pay
the plaintiff damages equal to the property's diminution in value resulting from the temporary designation. 661 The court upheld the trial
court's award of summary judgment in favor of the city reasoning that
the "mere designation of the property as a [potential] school site" did
not constitute a compensable taking. 662 The designation of the property "did not amount to a concrete indication... [of an] inten[tion] to
654. Id. at 332. See Gackstetter v. State, 618 P.2d 564, 566 (Alaska 1980) ("just
compensation is determined by what the owner has lost and not by what the condemnor has gained").
655. Vezey, 798 P.2d at 332-34 (citing State v. Alaska Continental Dev. Corp., 630
P.2d 977 (Alaska 1980); City of Valdez v. 18.99 Acres, More or Less, 686 P.2d 682
(Alaska 1984); State v. Arnold, 218 Or. 43, 341 P.2d 1089 (1959) ("Arnold I")). The
court adopted the rationale of Arnold 1, stating that "[]n estimating the value of the
property it is entirely proper to consider the state's need for it .. " Arnold I, 218 Or.
at 50, 341 P.2d at 1093 (quoted in Vezey, 798 P.2d at 333).
656. Vezey, 798 P.2d at 334.
657. Id. at 335.
658. Vezey, 798 P.2d at 335 (quoting Dash v. State, 491 P.2d 1069, 1072 n.6
(Alaska 1971) (interpreting ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.310)).
659. Id. at 335-36.
660. 791 P.2d 610 (Alaska 1990).
661. Id. at 611.
662. Id. at 614-15.
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condemn the property." 663 The taking was a mere potentiality. 664
The court ruled that the plaintiff could not compel the school district
to consummate the sale because the district had discretion to make the
665
final site selection.
In 22,757 Square Feet, More or Less v. State,666 the dispute

emerged over compensation
for land condemned under the state
"quick take" provisions.6 67 The controversy centered around the interpretation of Alaska Statutes section 09.55.450668 in light of the fact

that the property owners had continued to use the land after title
vested in the state. The Alaska Supreme Court held that the property
owners were entitled to prejudgment interest, accruing from the date
title vested in the state, 669 that is, the date on which the initial filing

and deposit was made by the state. 670 The Alaska Supreme Court also

ruled that as the property owners possessed the land, without giving
the state any consideration, for the period between the state's filing of
its complaint and its seizure of possession, the state was entitled to an
offset for this period. 6 71 Justice Rabinowitz dissented, arguing that
"Alaska Statute[s] [section] 09.55.450(a) is designed to prevent a condemnee from receiving both interest on the money equivalent of the
property taken and the continued use of the property by the
condemnee." 672
663. Id. at 614. The court stressed that "the objective manifestations of the government's intention to take the property are critical to the decision whether there was
a taking." Id.
664. Id. (citing Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 118,
514 P.2d 111, 116, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799, 804 (1973) (no "concrete indication" that
plaintiff's land would be condemned for school use after mere enactment of general
plans)).
665. Id. at 613. The court relied on its holding in Tunley v. Municipality of
Anchorage School District, 631 P.2d 67 (Alaska 1981) that the school board had independent legal responsibilities distinct from those of the municipality. Id. The court
reasoned that, as controller of the school budget, only the school could make the
ultimate decision to purchase the land selected. Id.
666. 799 P.2d 777 (Alaska 1990).
667. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.420-460 (1983); see Arco Pipeline Co. v. 3.60 Acres,
More or Less, 539 P.2d 64, 71 (1975) (holding that ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.55.420-450
"were clearly intended to authorize a more summary and less judicially dependent
exercise of the power of eminent domain.").
668. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.450(a) requires that the right of entry shall not
be granted to the state until after the running of the time for petitioner to file an
objection, or until after the hearing on any objection made within time allowed by law.
If the party in possession withdraws any part of the compensation award and remains
in possession, the court may fix a reasonable rental during the time of such possession.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.450(a) (1983).
669. 22,757 Sq. Ft., 799 P.2d at 799-80.
670. Id. at 799 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.440(a) (1983)).
671. Id. at 781.
672. Id. at 782 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting).
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In Ehrlander v. State,673 the plaintiff sought inverse condemnation when his request to subdivide certain real property was delayed
by the Department of Transportation (the "DOT"). 674 The supreme
court held that even though formal condemnation proceedings had not
begun, the plaintiff would be entitled to compensation if he was denied
675
the economic advantages of ownership.
Once the State manifested its unequivocal intent to appropriate the
*.. property, [the owners] were precluded from exercising their
business judgment and selling the property before the market fell
further. Moreover, [the owners] were precluded from taking any
steps to counteract the market decline by making improvements on
the land or otherwise changing its use. Thus, [the owners] were
deprived of the most important
676 incidents of ownership, the rights to
use and alienate property.
The plaintiff also claimed that the DOT was liable for the borough
platting board's denial of his request for subdivision. 677 The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the DOT on this issue since
Ehrlander had not shown any evidence that the DOT had urged the
board's denial. 678
B.

Landlord-Tenant Law

In reversing the lower court's grant of summary judgment for the
landlord in Berrey v. Jeffcoat,6 79 the supreme court held that the tenant's withholding of rent over a repair dispute may have been an appropriate self-help remedy. 680 Although the lease did not require the
tenant to make off-premises repairs, the court held that landlords have
an obligation to make repairs necessary to make the property suitable
for its contemplated use. 681 Failure to do so may give rise to the availability of self-help remedies. 682 The court remanded the case because
genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether the prem683
ises were unsuitable for their contemplated use.
The court's continued reliance on City of Kenai v. Ferguson6 84 is
noteworthy. In Berrey, the court reiterated the principle outlined in
Ferguson that the court is capable of writing into the terms of a lease
673.
674.
675.
676.

797 P.2d 629 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 630-32.
Id. at 635.
Id. (quoting Lange v. State, 86 Wash. 2d 585, 595, 547 P.2d 282, 288 (1976)).

677. Id.
678. Id. at 635-36.
679. 785 P.2d 20 (Alaska 1990).
680. Id. at 22-23.

681. Id. at 22 (citing

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY

682. Id.
683. Id.
684. 732 P.2d 184, 187 (Alaska 1987).

§ 5.4 (1977)).
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renegotiation those terms upon which the parties themselves cannot
agree if the parties had previously agreed to renegotiate these terms in
the future.68 5
In Gordon v. Foster, Garner& Williams, 686 a landlord-tenant dispute arose when the tenant vacated the leased premises after being
unable to negotiate commercially reasonable insurance coverage. The
lease was contingent upon the tenant's ability to negotiate such coverage, and, although the landlord offered to waive the insurance requirement, the tenant elected to abandon the lease. 6 7 The landlord sued
for breach of contract, and the superior court granted summary judgment in his favor, holding that the insurance contingency was not a
condition precedent to the lease, but even if it were, the tenant
lease because the landlord had waived the
breached the
68 8
requirement.
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that the landlord had not waived the insurance requirement, that the requirement
was a condition precedent to performance of the lease, and that there
acted
were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the tenant had
68 9
in good faith in attempting to negotiate insurance coverage.
C. Miscellaneous
Olson v. State690 overruled a 1989 case, Messerli v. Departmentof
NaturalResources,69 1 that employed a "reasonable basis" standard of
review in reviewing preference rights decisions of the Department of
Natural Resources ("DNR"). 692 The Olson court decided that a deferential "arbitrary and capricious" or "abuse of discretion" standard
was proper in appeals of discretionary agency actions not requiring
formal procedures.6 93 Olson arose from a decision of the DNR denying the plaintiffs' preference rights in connection with the Chase III
homestead land disposal. The plaintiffs, having been successful in the
Chase III lottery, argued that their losses in the invalidation of Chase
111694 entitled them to preference rights to purchase their Chase III
parcels. 695 The DNR refused to grant such a preference, and the
685. Berrey, 785 P.2d at 24 (quoting Ferguson, 732 P.2d at 187).
686. 785 P.2d 1196 (Alaska 1990).
687. Id. at 1198.

688. Id.
689. Id. at 1199-1200.
690. 799 P.2d 289 (Alaska 1990).
691. 768 P.2d 1112 (Alaska 1989).
692. Id. at 1120.
693. Olson, 799 P.2d at 293.
694. See Alaska Survival v. State, 723 P.2d 1281 (Alaska 1986) (invalidating the
Chase III disposal program lottery).
695. Olson, 799 P.2d at 290-91.
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plaintiffs appealed. Applying the abuse of discretion standard, the
696
supreme court atfirmed the DNR ruling.
The appeal in Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom697 followed a jury verdict
that the defendants satisfied the requirements of adverse possession
and therefore could not be evicted from plaintiff's land as the defendants had been in adverse possession of the land. Alaska Statutes section 09.10.030 provides that if a party adversely possesses real
property for ten consecutive years, an action cannot be maintained to
recover the property, effectively vesting title in the adverse possessor.698 To establish title through adverse possession, a party must
prove by clear and convincing evidence that " 'his use of the land was
continuous, open and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true
owner'" for the ten years. 699 The supreme court held that although
the physical acts necessary to establish continuous, open and notorious
possession vary with the nature of the land in dispute, an adverse possessor need only use the land as an average owner of similar property
7°°
would use it.
Where the land is rural, as in this case, a lesser degree
of dominion and control may be reasonable.7 0 ' Based on these requirements and the factual findings implicit in the jury's verdict, the
court found that the defendants had established continuous,
open and
70 2
notorious possession for ten years prior to the suit.
The court also rejected the plaintiff's claims that the defendants
were not "hostile" because, as Native Americans, they thought of
themselves as stewards of the land rather than as owners. 70 3 The court
reiterated the principle that "[h]ostility is instead determined by application of an objective test which simply asks whether the possessor
'acted toward the land as if he owned it.' ,,704 In short, the court
found all the elements of adverse possession for the portion of the land
which the defendants actively used,70 5 but remanded for consideration
the issue of whether the defendants had established adverse possession
of the entire parcel. 70 6 The court noted that using woodland paths in
some areas and picking up litter was insufficient to establish adverse
70 7
possession, as was marking off the land with boundary posts.
696. Id. at 295.
697. 799 P.2d 304 (Alaska 1990).
698. ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.030 (1983).
699. Smith v. Krebs, 768 P.2d 124, 125 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1984)).
700. Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 309.
701. Id. at 310.
702. Id. at 311.
703. Id.
704. Id.at 310 (quoting Hubbard, 684 P.2d at 848).
705. Id.
706. Id.at 311.
707. Id.
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Finally, the court supported the trial court's award of attorney's
fees to the defendants over the argument of the plaintiff that the award
was inappropriate under Sjong v. State70 8 as he was defending an important right. 70 9 The court did, however, vacate the award of fees until the trial court determined the boundaries of the defendants'
property, and therefore determined the appropriate prevailing
7 10
party.
In Graeber v. Hickel Investment Co., 711 the supreme court held
that under the Ship Mortgage Act 7 12 "an attaching creditor prevails
over the unrecorded interests of a prior purchaser of the debtor's vessel."' 7 13 The court read the language of the statute literally and found
no compelling reasons for reaching a contrary result.7 14 Hickel sued
Klosterman, its debtor, obtaining a prejudgment attachment against
Klosterman on February 3, 1988. Eight days later, Klosterman sold
his ship to Briske, who sold the ship to Graeber in June 1988. Neither
71 5
of these sales were recorded as required by the Ship Mortgage Act.
The court noted in affirming the lower court decision that although
to allow
Graeber had an equitable interest in the ship, Congress' intent
7 16
parties to rely upon recordation of title was paramount.
Knedlik v. State7 17 dealt with an appeal from a decision of the
Alaska Real Estate Commission denying Knedlik reimbursement from
the Real Estate Surety Fund for a failed sale closure. The sale negotiations involved several exchanges of money, part of which was earnest
money, part a down payment and part consideration for an extension
of the closing date.71 8 As it was unclear what portion of the money
was intended to be refundable, the supreme court reversed and remanded for a specific finding on whether the money was intended by
the parties to be refundable in the event of a breach. 7 19 The court
noted that if the money was meant to be nonrefundable, the Surety
Fund, to avoid payment, would have the opportunity to prove that the
resulting from the breach were less than the partial
plaintiff's damages720
payment received.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.
718.
719.
720.

622 P.2d 967 (Alaska 1981).
Fagerstrom, 799 P.2d at 312.
Id. at 313.
803 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1990).
46 U.S.C.A. § 921 (West 1975) (repealed 1988).
Graeber, 803 P.2d at 872.
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 871-72.
Id. at 874.
803 P.2d 400 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 400-01.
Id. at 402.
Id.
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In von (Yemmingen v. First National Bank of Anchorage,721 the

plaintiff appealed an adverse grant of summary judgment in a suit in
which he sought to satisfy a judgment against his former employers for
unpaid real estate commissions by attaching their escrow accounts

maintained at defendant bank. 722 The supreme court reversed, hold-

ing that the property liable to execution included not only the accounts, but also the "rights and duties owed to judgment debtors
pursuant to the terms of those accounts. '723 The court reasoned that
the bank, acting as the escrow agent, possessed the property of the
judgment debtors and that the bank's failure to surrender the property
resulted in liability for the value of the deposits made by plaintiff's
72 4
former employers since the execution of the writ.
XI.

TAX

Only two tax cases were decided by the Alaska Supreme Court in
1990. In City of Valdez v. State,725 the supreme court affirmed the
lower court's ruling that it was a violation of Alaska Statutes section
43.56.010(b) 726 for the city to impose a higher tax mill rate on oil and
gas property than on other property in the city.727 The city of Valdez

had imposed the higher tax on oil and gas property to raise money to
pay for oil pollution control services. 728 The court noted that the two
statutes conflicted, and restated its position that, when two statutes are
in conflict, the more specific statute governs. 729 As section
43.56.010(b) dealt specifically with the subject of tax rates on oil and
gas property, the court held that it governed and thus invalidated the
tax. 730
In Union Oil Co. v. State,7 3 the supreme court discussed the appropriate formula for calculating tax exempt income and actual tax
liability. A Union Oil subsidiary was granted a tax exempt certificate
721. 789 P.2d 353 (Alaska 1990).
722. Id. at 354.
723. Id. at 355-56.

724. Id. at 356-57.
725. 793 P.2d 532 (Alaska 1990).
726. Under section 43.56.010(b), the municipality may tax oil and gas property
only "at the rate of taxation that applies to other property taxed by the municipality.
The tax shall be levied at a rate no higher than the rate applicable to other property
taxable by the municipality." ALASKA STAT. § 43.56.010(b) (1990).
727. City of Valdez, 793 P.2d at 533-34.
728. Id. at 532. The city argued that under Alaska Statues section 29.45.580, the
disparate tax was allowable, "so long as the oil and gas property receive[d] a higher
level of city services." Id. at 533; see ALASKA STAT. § 29.45.580 (1986).
729. City of Valdez, 793 P.2d at 533 (citing Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 415
(Alaska 1979); State v. Green, 586 P.2d 595, 602 (Alaska 1978)).
730. Id. at 533-35.
731. 804 P.2d 62 (Alaska 1990) ("Union II").
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under the Alaska Industrial Incentive Act.7 32 Union Oil applied this

certificate in determining the tax liability of the entire company under
the formulary apportionment method. 733 In an administrative decision, the Department of Revenue ("DOR") determined that the separate accounting method7 34 should have been utilized instead and that
the amount so determined could only be applied, using the formulary
approach, against the subsidiary's tax liability, not against Union Oil's
tax liability. 735 The DOR's decision was upheld by the Alaska
Supreme Court in an earlier decision. 736 Union Oil paid the tax and
then sued for a refund. After the DOR and the superior court ruled
against Union Oil in the tax refund suit, Union Oil appealed to the
737
supreme court.

The supreme court first stated that the appropriate standard of
review of the DOR's decision was that of a reasonable basis, in part
because the interpretation of the tax statute involved "policy questions
within the DOR's area of expertise that are inseparable from the facts
'738
underlying the DOR's decision.
In affirming, the court noted that DOR had correctly focused on
the source of the income and that separate accounting was the most
appropriate method to make the distinction between sources and activities. 739 Finally, the court noted that in the future, the separate accounting method must be utilized to calculate exempt income, and
that formulary
apportionment should be used to determine actual
74
liability. 0

732. ALASKA STAT. § 43.25, repealed by 1986 Alaska Sess. Laws § 63 ch. 37.
733. Union II,804 P.2d at 63.
734. The court noted that:
Separate accounting takes the gross income of the business and deducts
all allowable business expenses to arrive at a net taxable income. The net
taxable income is multiplied by the applicable tax schedule rate to determine
the tax liability. For purposes of the industrial income tax exemption Certificate, the tax liability is deemed a tax credit, zeroing out tax liability.
Under formulary apportionment '[t]he property, payroll and sales fractions ('factors' under the statute) are averaged and an 'ideal' fraction is arrived at which reflects the degree of state connectedness of the business
entity's [worldwide] income. Only this fraction of the entire income is then
taxed by the state.' 'Because the apportioned income to a state depends on
this world-wide apportionable income, it is not uncommon in a particular
state for apportioned income to be greater or less than the income in the
state if determined by the separate accounting method.'
Id. at 63 n.3.
735. Id. at 63.
736. Union Oil Co. v. State, 677 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Alaska 1984) ("Union I").
737. Union II, 804 P.2d at 64.
738. Id.
739. Id. at 65.
740. Id. at 65-66.
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TORTS

The court decided twelve tort cases during 1990, one involving
judicial misconduct, four involving professional malpractice and seven
involving negligence.
A. Judicial Misconduct
In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge7 4 1 was decided on the basis of
the American Bar Association Lawyer Sanctions. 74 2 The judge self-

validated airline tickets through a defunct airline when he knew the
agreements permitting the self-validations could be terminated at any
time.74 3 Despite knowing that a bankruptcy trustee had controlled the
airline for nearly two years, and that a reasonable lawyer would have
consulted the trustee before self-validating tickets, the judge did not
verify whether the agreements were still in effect before acting. 7 " The
Alaska Commission on Judicial Conduct recommended that the judge
be publicly reprimanded, 745 as his activities constituted a violation of

Alaska Statutes section 22.30.01 1(a)(3)(C) and (D),746 and of Canons

1 and 2A of the Code of Judicial Conduct. 747 In independently evaluating the judge's conduct 748 under the four-part test suggested in the
741. 788 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1990).
742. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANC-

TIONS (1986), reprintedin ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, §§ 01:801-01:856 (1986) [hereinafter ABA Standards]. These standards were
adopted by the court in DisciplinaryMatter Involving Buckalew, 731 P.2d 48, 51-52
(Alaska 1986). The court used these standards by analogy instead of the American
Bar Association Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement
because the latter govern only a few serious offenses, none of which were at issue in
the case. Inquiry, 788 P.2d at 723. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS
RELATING TO JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY RETIREMENT (1978), reprinted
in NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR JOINT COMMITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE FOR LAWYERS AND JUDGES (1979).

743. Inquiry, 788 P.2d at 721.
744. Id.
745. Id. at 722.
746. These sections provide:
(a) The commission shall on its own motion or on receipt of a written complaint inquire into an allegation that a judge
(3)

committed an act or acts that constitute

(C) conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice;
(D) conduct that brings the judicial office into disrepute ....
ALASKA STAT. §§ 22.30.011(a)(3)(C), 22.30.01 l(a)(3)(D) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
747. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canons 1, 2 (1984).
748. Inquiry, 788 P.2d at 722 (citing In re Hanson, 532 P.2d 303, 307-09 (Alaska
1975) (the court has the ultimate decision in judicial qualification matters)).
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ABA standards, 749 the court found that the judge negligently failed to
appreciate the potential risks of his actions, thereby creating an appearance of impropriety. 7 50 The court also found that the degree 7of
5
actual or potential injury caused by the negligence was minimal. '
Based on these findings and the presence of such mitigating factors as
an unblemished record and an expression of remorse, the court held
that although752a private reprimand was essential, public censure was
unnecessary.
B.

Malpractice

In Drake v. Wickwire,753 the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against his attorney for allegedly inducing him to break an earnest
money sale agreement.7 54 The defendant advised his client, the seller,
to break the agreement after the buyers' realtor stated that the buyers
were "resisting the pressure to close."' 755 The attorney claimed the
buyers were anticipatorily repudiating the contract to buy. 7 5 6 The
supreme court held that the attorney acted negligently in advising his
client to engage in precipitous conduct in the face of an ambiguous
statement that 7was insufficient to indicate anticipatory repudiation of
75
the contract.
In Jones v. Wadsworth 758 the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the
lower court, permitting a legal malpractice action to be governed by
the six-year statute of limitations for a contract action rather than the
normal two-year statute of limitations for a tort action. 759 The court
stated that the six-year statute of limitations would not be applicable
to every case involving professional malpractice, but that this case was
749. The standards ask the following questions:
1) What ethical duty did the [judge] violate? (A duty to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession?)
2) What was [the judge's] mental state? (Did [the judge] act intentionally,
knowingly, or negligently?)
3) What was the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the
[judge's] misconduct? (Was there a serious or potentially serious injury?)
4) Are there any aggravating or mitigating circumstances?
Buckalew, 731 P.2d at 52 (quoting ABA Standards, Theoretical Framework at
§ 01:805-06).
750. Inquiry, 788 P.2d at 724.
751. Id.
752. Id. at 726.
753. 795 P.2d 195 (Alaska 1990).
754. Id.
755. Id. at 197.
756. Id. at 196.
757. Id. at 198.
758. 791 P.2d 1013 (Alaska 1990).
759. Id. at 1015.
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premised on the nonperformance of a specific promise contained in an
express contract. 760 The attorney had made a verbal commitment to
"move the case to trial expeditiously" and to keep Jones "informed" of
the case's progress.7 6 1 The court found that the presence of such an
express agreement made the claim a contract action rather than a tort
action, 762 and distinguished this case from its earlier decision in Van
Horn Lodge, Inc. v. Wfhite 7 6 3 which did not involve an express
7
agreement. &I
Beiland v. O.K. Lumber Co. 765 arose after Belland, who was hired
to represent the plaintiffs in a real estate transaction, allegedly failed to
discover the existence of a federal tax lien on the property before filing
a deed of trust to secure a loan for the purchase of the land. 766 A jury
found Belland guilty of legal malpractice, but the supreme court reversed. 767 The court found that although the defendant breached his
professional duty, there was no actual damage to the plaintiffs since
their security interest, a purchase-money mortgage, enjoyed priority
over the federal tax lien.768 Consequently, the court remanded for a
769
directed verdict in favor of the defendant.
The final case in this subcategory involved elements of a wrongful
birth action, although the claim sounded in medical malpractice. In
Poor v. Moore,770 the plaintiff brought a malpractice action against a
biofeedback therapist whose seduction of her during treatment resulted in her becoming pregnant.7 7 1 The United States District Court
for the District of Alaska certified questions of law to the Alaska
Supreme Court. 772 The supreme court found that, despite the inappropriate sexual conduct on the part of the defendant, the plaintiff was
not relieved of her statutory duty to support the child, 773 and could
7 74
not recover as damages the costs of raising the child.
760. Id. at 1016-17.
761. Id. at 1016.
762. Id. at 1015-17 (citing Towns v. Frey, 149 Ariz. 599, 721 P.2d 147 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); Pittman v. McDowell, Rice & Smith, 12 Kan. App. 2d 603, 752 P.2d 711
(Kan. Ct. App. 1988)).
763. 627 P.2d 641 (Alaska 1982) overruled by Lee Houston & Assoc. v. Racine,
No. 3668, slip op. at 16 (Alaska March 1, 1991).
764. Jones, 791 P.2d at 1016.
765. 797 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1990).
766. Id. at 639.
767. Id. at 642.
768. Id. at 641-42.
769. Id. at 642.
770. 791 P.2d 1005 (Alaska 1990).
771. Id. at 1006.
772. Id. at 1005.
773. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.030 (1983).
774. Poor, 791 P.2d at 1007. The court drew on the reasoning of the California
Court of Appeals in BarbaraA. v. John G., which found that public policy prevents
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However, the supreme court did find that the plaintiff retained a
remedy in tort where she could conceivably recover damages for
Moore's conduct, including medical expenses, pain and suffering, and
lost wages as well as damages for emotional distress and punitive damages if warranted. 77 5 The court also held that, apart from any tort
damages, the plaintiff was entitled to recover partial costs of actual
of Civil Procedure
child care expenditures, pursuant to Alaska Rule
77 6
90.3 and an award of prospective child support.
C.

Negligence

The cases discussed in this subcategory include two related to
landlord-tenant law, while the remaining cases concern a variety of
issues including liability under the dram-shop statute, damages recoverable in wrongful death actions, tolling of statutes of limitations in
products liability actions, and pure negligence.
In Coburn v. Burton,777 the plaintiff, a guest of the defendant's
tenant, broke her ankle when she slipped and fell on ice in front of the
defendant's building. According to a provision in the tenant's lease,
the tenant was responsible for removing snow and ice from his own
sidewalk and driveway. 778 The trial judge denied admission of evidence relating to that provision, reasoning that it was invalid under
the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, Alaska Statutes
section 34.03.100(a)(2), which requires the landlord to "keep all com-

mon areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition.1 779 On the

defendant-landlord's appeal from a jury finding of negligence on his
part, the supreme court held that the trial judge should have determined whether the area where plaintiff fell was a common area or one
"occupied and used" by the tenent, and should have allowed the
78 0
tenent's lease as evidence on that question.

In Babinec v. Yabuki 78 1 the supreme court upheld the trial
court's refusal to grant a new trial in a personal injury case. The
plaintiff suffered lower back and leg injuries when a step in the stairway of her landlord's building collapsed. The jury awarded her
$550,000 and her husband $50,000 on their respective negligence and
one parent from suing the other over the wrongful birth of a child. 145 Cal. App. 3d
369, 379, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 449 (1983).
775. Poor, 791 P.2d at 1008.
776. Id. at 1007.
777. 790 P.2d 1355 (Alaska 1990).
778. Id. at 1356.
779. Id. (quoting ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.100(a)(2) (1990)).
780. Id. at 1356-58; see ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.100(a)(2) & 34.03.120(a) (1990).
781. 799 P.2d 1325 (Alaska 1990).
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loss of consortium claims.7 82 The majority of the case is unremarkable, but one aspect of it deserves note. The supreme court held that,
for purposes of his loss of consortium claim, evidence of the husband's
painful emotional past was admissible under Alaska Rules of Evidence
401 and 403 because it bore on his close relationship with his wife and
78 3
was more probative than prejudicial.
In Gonzales v. Krueger,7 84 the plaintiff, an injured passenger in a
single-car auto accident, appealed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the defendant, Safeway. Safeway sold liquor to a second
passenger in the car, who subsequently shared the alcohol with the
driver immediately before the accident.7 85 Safeway successfully argued before the trial court that it was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries because it had sold alcohol to a passenger, not the driver, and that,
therefore, the transaction was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 786 Safeway also argued that at the time of the transaction the driver was not visibly intoxicated and therefore was not a
78 7
"drunken person" at the time of the sale.
On appeal, the supreme court rejected both of Safeway's arguments. It found that although the driver of the car may not have been
a "drunken person" for purposes of the statute, Safeway was not immune from liability: it did sell liquor to the passenger, who was a
"drunken person. 7 8 8 The court also found the question of whether
the sale of liquor to the passenger was the proximate cause of the accident to be one of fact for the jury and inappropriate for summary
78 9
judgment.
In Portwood v. Copper Valley Electric Association,7 90 the lower
court ruled that punitive damages were not recoverable in a wrongful
death action when the decedent was not survived by a spouse, child or
other dependents.7 9 ' Relying on Tommy's Elbow Room v. Kavorkian,792 the court reversed, holding that the pecuniary loss limitation
in the Alaska wrongful death statute is directed at the amount of compensatory damages recoverable when a person dies without statutory
782. Id. at 1326.
783. Id. at 1334-35.
784. 799 P.2d 1318 (Alaska 1990).
785. Id. at 1319.
786. Id. at 1320.
787. Id; see ALASKA STAT. § 04.21.020 (1986).
788. Gonzales, 799 P.2d at 1320.
789. Id.
790. 785 P.2d 541 (Alaska 1990).
791. Id.
792. 727 P.2d 1038, 1049 (Alaska 1986) (holding that punitive damages may be
awarded in a wrongful death claim where the wrongdoer "acted outrageously or with
reckless indifference").
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beneficiaries. 793 Because punitive damages are by definition not com-

pensatory, they are not subject to such a limitation; therefore, they are
79 4
recoverable by the estate of a person who dies without beneficiaries.
In Yurioff v. American Honda Motor Co., 7 9 5 the supreme court
upheld the superior court's award of summary judgment to the manufacturer in a products liability suit concerning a malfunctioning allterrain vehicle, agreeing that the two-year statute of limitations had
expired before the complaint was filed. 796 The court rejected plaintiff's claim that the statute of limitations was tolled for the three days
he spent in bed recuperating from the accident.797 The two-year stat-

ute of limitations begins to run when the potential plaintiff "reason-

ably should have begun an inquiry to protect his rights."' 798 It was
enough that the plaintiff knew the vehicle malfunctioned and an accident was caused. 79 9 The court similarly rejected plaintiff's claim that
the statute was tolled by his subsequent incarceration on another matter, since he was not incarcerated at the time the cause of action
o
accrued.80
In Green v. Plutt,801 the supreme court reversed a jury verdict and

held that the last car involved in a four-car, rear-end collision was

negligent and liable to the driver of the second car in the collision.80 2
The supreme court relied on its decision in Grimes v. Haslett,80 3 on
somewhat similar facts, in concluding that drivers on city streets must
793. Portwood, 785 P.2d at 543. Alaska Statutes section 09.55.580(a) provides in

part:

When the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omission of
another, the personal representatives of the former may maintain an action
therefor against the latter, if the former might have maintained an action,
had the person lived, against the latter for an injury done by the same act or
omission. The action shall be commenced within two years after the death,
and the damages therein shall be the damages the court or jury may consider
fair and just. The amount recovered, if any, shall be exclusively for the benefit of the decedent's spouse and children when the decedent is survived by a
spouse or children, or other dependents. When the decedent is survived by no
spouse or children or other dependents, the amount recoveredshall be administered as other personalpropertyof the decedent but shall be limited to pecuniary loss.
ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.580(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
794. Portwood, 785 P.2d at 543.
795.
796.
797.
798.
1988)).

803 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1990).
ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.070 (1983).
Yurioff, 803 P.2d at 390.
Id. at 389 (citing Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Afaska

Id. at 389; see

799. Id. at 389-90.
800. Id. at 390 (interpreting

ALASKA STAT.

801. 790 P.2d 1347 (Alaska 1990).

802. Id. at 1349.
803. 641 P.2d 813 (Alaska 1982).

§ 09.10.140 (1990)).
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anticipate sudden stops and must maintain an appropriate speed. 804
The court could "perceive of no explanation for the accident which
[did] not include negligence on [the defendant's] part." 80 5 Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded the case for trial on the issue
of damages.8 0 6 In dissent, Justices Moore and Rabinowitz argued that
Green was distinguishable from Grimes in part because the defendant
in Grimes had admitted to following too closely. 80 7 The dissenters objected to the majority's conclusion that, since the defendant was unable to stop, she must, as a matter of law, have been negligent. a80
In Matomco Oil Co. v. Arctic Mechanical, Inc.,80 9 the supreme
court upheld. the denial of a directed verdict that, as a matter of law,
one is liable for the acts of its independent contractor. The dispute
arose as a result of the explosion of Matomco's fuel tanker while it was
being repaired by an independent contractor. The explosion destroyed
the property of two businesses, one of which was Arctic. 81 0 The jury
of
found that Matomco was liable to the plaintiffs for damages 8 11
$441,000 and that the plaintiffs were not comparatively negligent.
The lower court's denial of Matomco's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that it is not liable for the acts of its independent
contractors was affirmed by the supreme court. 8 12 However, the court
did reverse and remand on two grounds: an erroneous jury instruction
on per se negligence for violating an Alaska Occupational Safety and
Health Administration regulation; 81 3 and the erroneous submission to
the jury of the issue of whether the welding, buffing or grinding of a
activity when it was properly a
petroleum tanker is an ultrahazardous
81 4
question for the court.
Jayne E. Powell
Ellen L. Lyons

804.
805.
806.
807.
808.
809.
810.
811.
812.
813.
814.

Green, 790 P.2d at 1349.
Id.
Id. at 1350.
Id. at 1351 (Moore, J., dissenting) (citing Grimes, 641 P.2d at 819).
Id.
796 P.2d 1336 (Alaska 1990).
Id. at 1338.
Id.
Id. at 1340.
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